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Emotions and Crime over the Life Course: A
Neo-Meadian Perspective on Criminal
Continuity and Change1
Peggy C. Giordano




Bowling Green State University
A symbolic interactionist perspective on the emotions is presented
that highlights their social character, forges links to cognitive pro-
cesses, and suggests ways in which emotions influence long-term
patterns of criminal involvement. This neo-Meadian perspective
contrasts with theories of desistance that focus on the role of informal
social controls and develops the view of an emotional self that flour-
ishes somewhat independent of the major role transitions typically
emphasized in sociological studies of the life course. The authors
also explore ways in which attention to the emotional realms of
experience adds to traditional treatments of the impact of adult
transition events (e.g., the “good marriage effect”). Interviews with
male and female adolescent offenders and two waves of adult follow-
up data document general patterns of association and support the
argument that a social view of emotional processes is critical to a
comprehensive understanding of life course patterns of criminal con-
tinuity and change.
INTRODUCTION
While Collins (1990, p. 27) has noted that “emotion potentially occupies
a crucial position in general sociological theory,” with some notable ex-
ceptions (Agnew 1992; Braithwaite 1989), emotional processes have not
1 We would like to thank Ross Matsueda, Emma Engdahl, and the AJS reviewers for
helpful feedback on several drafts of this article, and Josh Rossol, who contributed
significantly to the analysis. This project was supported by grants from the National
Institute of Mental Health (MH2905/MH46410) and the W. T. Grant Foundation.
Direct correspondence to Peggy Giordano, Bowling Green State University, Bowling
Green, Ohio. E-mail: pgiorda@bgsu.edu
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been central to criminological theorizing. In this article we focus on specific
ways in which attention to the emotional realms of experience adds to
our knowledge about adult patterns of criminal involvement. We draw
on insights from the sociology of emotions tradition in order to develop
a neo-Meadian perspective meant to highlight that emotions (a) are social,
(b) have strong cognitive underpinnings, and (c) influence long-term pat-
terns of criminal continuity and change.2 The analysis broadens the scope
of a symbolic interactionist perspective originally formulated as a theory
of cognitive transformation (Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002)
and develops further a critique of the control perspective on the desistance
process (Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003).
In order to illustrate these points more systematically, we draw on
quantitative and qualitative data derived from a long-term follow-up of
serious adolescent offenders. This sample is constructed of male and fe-
male youths who were originally interviewed in 1982 while incarcerated.
They were followed up and subsequently reinterviewed some 13 years
later, when the average age of the respondents was 29. Life history nar-
ratives were elicited from a majority of respondents at the time of this
initial adult follow-up. A new wave of interviews conducted with these
respondents in 2003 (when respondents averaged 38 years of age) provides
a longer time horizon from which to assess the degree to which and ways
in which emotional processes influence long-term patterns of criminal
behavior.3
BACKGROUND
The Age-Graded Theory of Informal Social Control
A major contribution of Sampson and Laub’s research (Sampson and
Laub 1993; Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003)
has been to document that, while delinquents are more likely than other
youths to have problems in adulthood, later life events frequently serve
to inhibit criminal involvement. Their research, relying on data originally
collected by Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, documented consid-
erable variability in patterns of adult crime, thus underscoring that crim-
2 The focus on emotions represents a shift from Mead’s original cognitive emphasis,
but can be considered neo-Meadian since his more general ideas (e.g., the concept of
role taking and focus on self-processes) are applicable to understanding the emotional
as well as cognitive realms of experience (Engdahl 2004; MacKinnon 1994).
3 Interviews in connection with this wave actually began in the latter part of 2002 and
some respondents were located and interviewed as recently as 2005. However, the
bulk of interviews were completed by 2003. Thus, for ease of presentation, throughout
the article we refer to the second wave of interviews as the 2003 interviews.
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inal behavior need not be conceptualized as resulting from a stable char-
acter or personality trait with inevitable lifelong consequences (but see
Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Life events such as getting married or
acquiring steady employment are viewed as key sources of redirection.
To conceptualize the change process, Sampson and Laub rely on a
version of control theory: over time such lifestyle changes have a stabi-
lizing effect and become part of a social and even financial investment
process that makes crime less likely (i.e., the idea of too much to lose). In
a more recent study, Laub and Sampson (2003) conducted interviews with
a subset of the original Glueck respondents as older men. Although they
explored a number of other factors that for some appeared to have a
beneficial influence (e.g., military experience, children), the authors con-
tinued to focus heavily on marriage effects. In addition to the increasing
investment idea, they noted that “what has not received enough attention
is the role that marriage plays in restructuring routine activities and the
direct social control that spouses provide, especially concerning deviant
peer group associations” (Laub and Sampson 2003, p. 135). While giving
credence to the idea of human agency, in general, and consistent with the
logic of the social control tradition, their emphasis has remained upon
processes external to the individual (as they continue to focus on what
the spouse does or what military experiences offer).
Our view is that the social control perspective describes important
mechanisms involved in desistance, but the resulting account of stability
and change processes is incomplete. First, two important classes of neg-
ative cases are not well explained: individuals who continue to offend,
even though they have acquired a spouse or gained employment, and
those who have managed to desist, even absent these powerful elements
of social control. These issues are particularly important to consider when
we focus on the situations facing many contemporary offenders, as mar-
riage over the last half century has been less likely and less stable than
in earlier eras, particularly for individuals with low SES and education
(see e.g., Booth, Crouter, and Shanahan 1999). In addition, the social
control perspective does a good job of explicating some of the long-term
benefits of a stable marriage, but is relatively silent on the issue of why
(save chance or luck—see e.g., Laub, Nagin, and Sampson 1998) some
individuals begin the process of moving toward a more conventional way
of life, or for that matter why some but not others “stick it out.” Indeed,
in some respects the control emphasis tells us more about the hows than
the whys of change, and little about mechanisms not tied to marriage or
other key transition experiences.
Another potential limitation of social control theory is that it is distin-
guished in large part by its proponents’ rejection of the importance of
social learning mechanisms (Hirschi 1969). Adhering to the logic of the
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perspective thus requires focusing exclusively on the existence of a bond
(marriage) or the quality of the bond, rather than on the criminal/prosocial
orientation of the partner (see Sampson and Laub 1993, p. 191). This idea
has not been a well-substantiated aspect of control theory as applied to
adolescent behavior (research shows that the delinquent behavior of one’s
peers influences the adolescent’s own conduct; see, e.g., Thornberry and
Krohn 1997), and in our view the partner’s criminality should not be
ignored when theorizing about the nature of the adult partner’s influence.
Related to this, control theorists assume a constant proclivity to deviate,
arguing that it is the degree of control that varies and is of greatest
substantive importance. This does not leave much room for motivational
considerations, as from the control point of view motivations or “mean-
ings” are seen as either fixed or irrelevant. Reflecting on such concerns,
we recently developed a symbolic interactionist perspective on the des-
istance process that serves as a conceptual counterpoint to the age-graded
theory of informal social control.
The Theory of Cognitive Transformation
A fundamental criticism of control theory and indeed most sociological
treatments of the life course is that it places too much conceptual weight
on a few key transition events, themselves currently in a state of change
and uncertainty. The focus is on the actions of the change agent, while
the actor is depicted as moving from adolescence to adulthood virtually
unchanged, but for the good fortune of experiencing one or more of these
events. A symbolic interactionist theory of desistance to a greater extent
thrusts the actor and actor-based changes into the foreground.4 Further,
Mead (1934) highlighted that all but the most habitual of actions engage
cognitive processes. Thus, we proposed a more conditional-upon-cogni-
tive-transformations view of criminal continuity and change (Giordano
et al. 2002; see also Farrall and Bowling 1999; Maruna 2001; Shover 1985,
1996). In describing specific types of cognitive transformations linked to
desistance, we also found it useful to distinguish cognitive and associated
behavioral changes that can be linked to one’s relationship with a spouse
(or exposure to other transformative experiences—we called these “hooks
for change”) and those that appear to unfold somewhat independently of
these role-based changes. The present analysis preserves this distinction,
but considers the role of emotions in relation to these two types of changes.
Our cognitive perspective emphasized that a basic motivation to change
generally precedes and accompanies sustained behavior change, but high-
4 For an excellent general introduction to the symbolic interactionist perspective as it
applies to criminological issues, see Matsueda (1992) and Matsueda and Heimer (1997).
This content downloaded from 129.1.62.221 on Thu, 10 Oct 2013 19:18:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Emotions and Crime
1607
lighted that individuals also vary in their openness and receptivity to
particular “hooks.” Thus, for example, Uggen (2000) found that somewhat
older men were more likely to benefit from job training when compared
with their younger counterparts—this hints at the importance of differ-
ential openness or receptivity to change efforts. Similarly, while faith-
based intervention programs for offenders are well intentioned, some in-
dividuals will undoubtedly be more receptive than others to such efforts,
and this may also be the case for the same individual at different points
in the life course. Mead (1934) noted that cognitive processes (and hence
changes in cognitions) emerge through a process of role taking, which
Shott described succinctly as the “process of putting oneself in another’s
position and taking that person’s perspective” (Shott 1979, p. 1323). Ac-
cording to Mead and other symbolic interactionists, then, thoughts, while
located within the individual, are nevertheless deeply social in origin.
This is an important point, because it steers us away from a view of
cognitive transformations as deriving from individualistic mental
processes.
Social experiences are important catalysts for change as they foster new
definitions of the situation (i.e., new attitudes) and a blueprint for how
to succeed as a changed individual. These notions fit well within the social
learning tradition, but we believe this somewhat more intentional, cog-
nitive version adds to traditional emphases of differential association the-
ory (Sutherland 1947). Specifically, we highlighted that, particularly in
adulthood, the individual has an important role in making agentic moves
in the direction of others who subsequently provide and reinforce the new
definitions (Giordano et al. 2002; see also Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).
And, consistent with other symbolic interactionist approaches, views of
self are seen as providing a higher level of organization and coherence to
these attitudes/cognitions and thus may operate so as to preserve behav-
ioral continuity or foster substantial change (Matsueda and Heimer 1997).
For example, some environments, such as prison, seem to provide an
impetus for change, yet provide little in the way of a satisfying and achiev-
able replacement self. Finally we focused particular attention on the role
of contrast effects in connection with role-taking and social influence
processes. Offenders have much to learn from others whose behavior
presents a strong contrast to their own criminal lifestyles, and this contrast
poses a distinct developmental challenge that maximizes opportunities for
further growth and development.5
As we describe in more detail below, this focus on contrast effects, while
generally helpful, does not offer a comprehensive view of role-taking
5 This accords with Mead’s discussion of the role of the problematic situation (see e.g.,
Mead 1904, pp. 604–5; see also Giordano et al. 2002).
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processes and, accordingly, of the social mechanisms that influence des-
istance from crime. Emotions also emerge in connection with role-taking
experiences and thus need to be incorporated into a more complete sym-
bolic interactionist perspective on criminal continuity and change. Fairly
subtle, incremental shifts in the character and management of the emo-
tions may facilitate desistance, and explicit attention to emotional pro-
cesses provides needed detail about the hows but especially the whys of
such role-based changes as the “good marriage effect.” A perspective that
includes the emotions is also useful to extend our prior interest in self-
views to include attention to the actor’s “emotional self.” Our view is that
emotional identities and self-representations can (1) foster criminal con-
tinuity or (2) increase the likelihood of experiencing episodic derailments
from a pattern of forward progress. The latter represent embarrassing
negative cases for the theory of cognitive transformation, and under some
conditions (i.e., the presence of a stable marriage) for the age-graded theory
of informal social control.
A NEO-MEADIAN THEORY OF EMOTIONS AND CRIME
Researchers across a number of disciplines are giving greater attention
to emotions as an important object of inquiry and basis of human action
(Collins 2004; Lawler and Thye 1999; Massey 2002; Pacherie 2002; Turner
2000).6 Following the early lead of scholars such as Dewey (1895), re-
searchers have also increasingly positioned themselves against the view
of cognitions and emotions as oppositional forces, instead forging a variety
of interconnections (see, e.g., Freeman 2000; Lively and Heise 2004;
Schwarz 2000; Seeburger 1992). This suggests the general feasibility of
specifying a broader symbolic interactionist approach to desistance that
encompasses emotional as well as cognitive processes.7
Within criminology, emotions are not central to most theoretical per-
spectives, including Sampson and Laub’s control theory, yet the work of
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), Braithwaite (1989), and Agnew (1992)
6 The recent intellectual interest in emotions stands in contrast to a much longer tra-
dition that downplayed or even denigrated the affective, subjective side of human
experiences. As Scheff (1990, p. 294) notes, “most formal theories of human behavior
are biased toward rational or material models of causation, because emotion and mood
do not seem real in our civilization.”
7 Mead (1904) argued that both emotions and cognitions arise from “problematic sit-
uations,” i.e., situations in which the actor cannot proceed ahead on the basis of past
habit—by virtue of the new situation, actions are blocked. This provides a Meadian
rationale for considering emotions and cognitions as interconnected phenomena (since
both unfold—or not—under similar circumstances). We are grateful to Ross Matsueda
for developing this insight.
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are important exceptions. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) develop the
argument that low self-control and associated impulsivity are features of
the individual personality that emerge early and continue as relatively
enduring traits throughout the life course. Some psychological research,
such as the notion of a “hostile attributional bias” also fosters the idea of
relatively stable individual differences in emotional attitudes and reactions
that are linked to antisocial behavior (e.g., Lochman and Dodge 1994).
These conceptions are consequential to theory building: to the degree that
we accept the notion that emotions derive from stable traits, it would be
neither useful nor necessary to develop a life course view of emotional
processes. Agnew and Braithwaite’s analyses offer a more dynamic view
of the connections between emotions and crime, suggesting the utility of
a life course approach. Braithwaite focused primarily on shaming pro-
cesses, an emotion that resonates most clearly with theories of informal
social control, but one that has symbolic interactionist roots as well (Mead
1918). Our analysis draws on this prior work on shame but directs at-
tention to other emotions: anger, excitement, sadness, and love.8
Emotional Changes Not Tied to Major Role Transitions
Agnew (1992) highlighted the role of anger in the genesis of delinquent
behavior, arguing that while a number of different sources may produce
a condition of strain, delinquent involvement is more likely when negative
life circumstances have elicited an angry emotional reaction. Agnew also
suggested that features of the adolescent period foster increases in this
emotion and the spike in delinquency routinely observed during the teen
years (Agnew 1997). In our view, a neo-Meadian approach to emotions
can make a contribution to our understanding of these processes, as Ag-
new has suggested that crime is “conditional” on anger, but has not fully
elucidated the origins of the angry response.9 In contrast, the symbolic
interactionist perspective suggests that the definition of situations as aver-
sive ones and angry reactions themselves emerge through a process of
role taking. Identification is strong within the context of early family life
and particularly within the parent-child bond. Thus, while some negative
8 Shott (1979, p. 1323) labeled emotions such as shame and embarrassment “the role-
taking emotions,” as these “virtually require role-taking for their evocation.” More
recently scholars have broadened the definition, in effect arguing that role taking is
involved in all emotional experience (Engdahl 2004). This expanded definition accords
with our interest in moving beyond shaming processes to consider other emotion links
to persistence and desistance.
9 In a recent analysis, Agnew et al. (2002) link the angry response to personality traits
of the individual, thus contrasting further with the perspective offered in the present
investigation.
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stimuli may derive from circumstances outside the family, the family is
likely to be an important site for the initial development of an angry
repertoire and over time an angry self. For example, a singular negative
event such as breaking up with a girlfriend is unlikely to sustain a stable
anger identity. Recurrent role-taking experiences will generally be re-
quired to shape and solidify the angry self.
Self-control theory (see Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) and our neo-
Meadian approach may equally theorize an important role for the angry
persona, but a symbolic interactionist perspective ascribes a social origin
to these aspects of the self and emphasizes their potential malleability in
light of subsequent social experiences. As individuals move forward into
adulthood, then, role-taking opportunities across an ever wider set of
social arenas may result in a diminution of the negative emotions that
originally connected to criminal behavior. In line with our prior focus on
cognitive processes, we argue that new attitudes and definitions (cogni-
tions) are central to these emotional transformations.
Katz’s (1988) phenomenological approach adds to this emotional picture
in his focus on the positive, sensate qualities of crime. This view is con-
sistent with many delinquents’ own accounts of the thrills and excitement
associated with their criminal exploits (Shaw 1930). The developmentally
appropriate emphasis on peers during adolescence provides a desirable
social forum within which some youths learn to imbue specific behaviors
such as drug/alcohol use, fighting, or stealing with these positive meanings.
Yet the idea of positive emotional connections and an emotional resonance
(both with criminal activities themselves and the personal associations
that foster them) adds to Sutherland’s (1947) more cognitively oriented
“excess of definitions” emphasis. And a youth’s developing self-concept
as one who is always “up” for a party or a fight helps to round out the
self, providing a sense of worth (an initial move toward self-realization—
albeit of a particularistic sort) that would be more difficult to craft and
sustain relying on themes of victimization and anger alone. Again, how-
ever, as youths move into the adult period, these positive emotional con-
nections to crime and associated views of self are less likely to receive
social backing of any kind. Thus a gradual diminution of positive emo-
tions connected to crime may also be associated with desistance processes.
The changes in emotions described above are part of what can be
considered the full or “real” emotional experience (Engdahl 2004). How-
ever, Hochschild and other sociology of emotions researchers highlight
the distinction between emotions as actually experienced and as manip-
ulated, managed, or displayed to others (Hochschild 1979; Scheff 1990).
Thus, a third life course change in the emotional realm with implications
for desistance is an increased ability to regulate or manage the emotions
in socially acceptable ways. The various coping strategies delinquents
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learn and increasingly find palatable may not be particularly distinctive
or novel (accessing one’s social support network, leaving a room), but the
stakes are higher than for many other young adults. These life lessons
are hypothesized to result from added exposure to others who themselves
routinely exhibit age-appropriate coping strategies and continue to express
disapproval of what are increasingly viewed by others (and eventually
the self) as the actor’s own more inappropriate and childish actions.
Cognitive transformations are important to the success of behavioral
changes that may result from these role-taking experiences as, over time,
delinquents may come to understand the degree to which their partici-
pation in delinquency and drug abuse has in fact been a less than ideal
coping strategy (Cullen 1984). Cognitive connections of this sort are related
to surface level emotional changes (the management idea), but eventually
to changes in the character of the emotional experience, and in the mean-
ing and salience of the deviant behavior itself. As described in more detail
in our theory of cognitive transformation, the latter can be considered the
capstone in terms of cognitive shifts associated with sustained behavior
change (Giordano et al. 2002).
The emotional mellowing processes described above are likely inter-
related. Thus, actors who are no longer as hostile toward their parents
as during their youth (a diminution of negative emotions) may in adult-
hood be more likely to turn to them as an important source of social
support (increased skill in emotion management). Our key point here is
that while such emotional changes may indeed be associated with a “good
marriage effect,” these may also occur as a part of development; in brief,
they do not fundamentally depend on the actions of a spouse or other
obvious catalyst.10
It is useful to foreground developmental changes in the character and
management of emotions as this serves to highlight that the emotional
self has a certain integrity and independence. Emotions conceptualized
as self-feelings as well as a stance toward the outer world emerge as a
consequential, ever-present feature of the self (Engdahl 2004; Lupton
1998). Yet individuals will vary in the nature of their adult social expe-
riences and in their openness to new directions. While associated with
negative and sometimes costly interchanges, from a symbolic interactionist
point of view, the angry self has meaning, incorporating aspects of past
10 Sampson and Laub have been critical of developmental approaches, arguing that
they derive from psychology, evoke the idea of fixed stages, and are inconsistent with
a life course perspective (Laub and Sampson 2001, 2003). We disagree with this as-
sessment, favoring Mead’s highly sociological conception of development as arising
“in the process of social experiences and activity; that is develops in the given individual
as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within
that process” (Mead 1964, p. 199).
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social experiences, present circumstances, and (emotional) attitude taking
into an imagined future. The angry self can, for example, take care of
itself in new and potentially frightening social situations. Thus, we expect
that while criminal involvement generally decreases with age, those within
an adult sample who continue to evidence a stronger anger identity will
be more likely to persist in crime and violent behavior—even after tra-
ditional predictors, including marital attachment, employment circum-
stances, and their own early behavioral profiles—have been taken into
account.
The role of positive emotions such as excitement during the adult years
is likely more complex. During adolescence, delinquent acts come to be
associated with excitement or thrills. Yet as suggested above, this positive
heightened emotionality is difficult to sustain, and for those with a chronic
history of delinquency may be replaced in adulthood with feelings of
regret, sadness, and depression.11 Thus, while a diminution of positive
emotional connections to crime should prove generally helpful, for mature
offenders the more relevant adult emotional dynamic is likely to be de-
pression. Negative emotional attitudes may directly inhibit the actor’s
ability to see a way out or make a concrete move away from criminal
activity.12 Numerous studies have documented the presence of co-occur-
ring disorders in jail and prison populations and in more general epide-
miological surveys (Abram and Teplin 1991), but it is also important to
consider this emotional stance toward the outer world and the self as
potentially directly inhibiting desistance processes as well.13 We expect
that higher levels of adult depression in a follow-up sample of juvenile
offenders will be associated with criminal persistence, net of traditional
predictors such as marital attachment and prior delinquent history.
We have suggested that patterns of stability and change in emotions
can proceed alongside or completely independent of major role transitions.
As suggested above, this contrasts with stable trait notions, but also with
Sampson and Laub’s life course approach. The changes we described can
also, however, be seen as providing an appropriate developmental back-
11 For an excellent general description of this shifting emotional landscape for delin-
quent youths, see Hagan, McCarthy, and Foster (2002). This notion of changes in the
character of emotional connections to crime is also generally consistent with Laub and
Sampson’s (2001) observation that factors influencing the initial onset of crime need
not be similarly implicated in adult persistence and desistance processes.
12 That individuals find themselves emotionally “stuck” in a pattern they find increas-
ingly difficult to justify to self and others in terms of fun, excitement, or other positive
meanings contributes further to negative emotions.
13 Maruna (2001) has described the worldviews of persisters as containing an element
of resignation and negativity. These worldviews could be a reflection of individual
differences between the more and less successful offenders, but also could be concep-
tualized as potentially malleable feeling states.
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drop (an emotional openness) to the very role performances that have, in
prior research, been shown to have a conventionalizing effect. This leads
us to describe such developmentally based dynamics as “secondary des-
istance processes.” Recognizing that role-based processes such as the tran-
sition to marriage can be highly consequential, however, we next consider
how attention to the emotional realm adds to an understanding of such
changes (we call these “primary desistance processes”), beyond the mech-
anisms previously elucidated in control or cognitively oriented studies of
the desistance process.
Role-Based Changes
Braithwaite (1989) emphasized the importance of shaming processes to
successful desistance from crime. Our own view is that while groups may
indeed shame their members (and to good effect), individuals will not
often search out new prosocial affiliations because of their shaming po-
tential. For chronic offenders whose emotional lives and selves are char-
acterized by a large measure of anger and depression and who have been
marginalized in multiple respects, shame only adds to the downward
emotional themes about the self that the actor has accumulated from
previous role-taking experiences.14 That the individual actively seeks li-
aisons or settings that will heighten feelings of guilt, shame, and embar-
rassment seems counterintuitive and incompatible with a number of the-
orists’ emphasis on the human striving for self-realization and a sense of
worth or purpose (McAdams et al. 1997).15 Our view is that, for individuals
with a significant history of chronic offending, then, shame is unlikely to
be the first and foremost emotional dynamic associated with long-term
behavior change.16
An important aspect of Braithwaite’s theorizing, however, has been to
highlight that shaming that occurs within a framework of love or caring/
concern is more likely to be effective as a dynamic associated with crime
cessation (Braithwaite 1989). We suggest reprioritizing these emotions,
placing greater weight on emotions such as love (or variations on this
emotion), and less on shaming processes. Indeed, it could be argued that
14 Sherman (1993) noted that feelings of shame and defiant pride that are perceived as
unjust can directly amplify deviant behavior.
15 Further, chronic offenders, prior to making a move toward the prosocial, have shown
themselves to be relatively inured to all manner of informal and formal shaming
attempts, some undoubtedly caring and well intentioned.
16 We agree with Braithwaite’s basic premise that if offenders’ early rule breaking had
been met with shaming that was reintegrative, the costly spiral of negative outcomes,
alienation, and further offending need not have ensued (see also Ahmed et al. 2001).
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shame is always secondary to other, more promising emotions.17 Sampson
and Laub’s (1993) emphasis on attachment processes is generally in line
with this idea, but as stated at the outset, their conceptualization of the
good marriage effect focuses more attention on long-term benefits (the
investment or social capital notion) and more recently on the importance
of added structure and monitoring (Laub and Sampson 2003).
A focus on emotional processes adds in specific ways to these theoretical
emphases and to our understanding of mechanisms underlying the des-
istance process. First, the emotional aspects of a developing relationship
are available early on; thus attention to positive emotions is useful as it
helps to explain the initial process of crossing over into prosocial territory.
Social control theory was developed as an explanation of adolescent con-
formity and delinquency, but during childhood, the youth’s membership
within the family requires little in the way of explanation.18 But while
the ongoing marriage similarly provides a measure of social control over
individual conduct, as suggested at the outset, the initial phase of moving
in the direction of a prosocial romantic partner has not been adequately
explained. This early phase is important, as chronic offenders have pre-
viously shown an aversion to “routine activities,” resistance to prosocial
advice, and avoided monitoring or control efforts from a number of dif-
ferent sources. In previous work, we theorized a more intentional, agentic
view of this crossing-over process, stressing the importance of the actor’s
own motivation to change.
The social control perspective is limited as a framework for under-
standing why the individual takes these initial steps toward the prosocial,
and, as we argued at the outset, places too much theoretical weight on
the actions of the spouse. The theory of cognitive transformation, in turn,
likely overtheorizes actor-based changes in perspective and the primacy
of associated agentic moves. A focus on role taking and the character of
emotions elicited through these positive social interactions, however,
serves to highlight the fully social aspects of the catalyst-actor relationship.
Sociology of emotions scholars such as Engdahl (2004) have pointed out
not only the importance of contrasts (our emphasis), but also stressed that
role taking involves a process of functional identification, in which in-
17 A reviewer hypothesized that this might vary, e.g., shaming might be more important
than love in Japan. We agree that this could vary, but nevertheless argue that some
degree of caring always precedes shaming (consistent with the original logic of control
theory), and, as we argue below—and inconsistent with control theory—the character
of the one who is loved is also a significant consideration.
18 The emphasis appropriately rests upon ongoing family dynamics, where it has been
demonstrated consistently that high levels of parental supervision and warmth are
associated with a decreased likelihood of delinquency involvement (Hirschi 1969; Jang
and Smith 1997; Patterson and Stouthamer-Loeber 1984).
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dividuals recognize that they are not precisely identical to other(s) but are
functionally identical (Miller 1973). In short, some level of social coor-
dination necessarily precedes role taking but in effect makes it possible.19
For example, a parole officer or passerby may present a strong contrast
to a focal actor, but absent this element of identification, role taking is
not likely to occur. Love, then, for some offenders, offers a critical role-
taking experience, one that draws inspiration from the process of func-
tional identification and a new direction from the element of contrast.
These coordinated social processes set up the most favorable conditions
for emotional, cognitive, and behavioral transformations, as well as en-
hanced informal social control. This emphasis is also generally consistent
with the view of scholars who have argued that emotions can be seen as
providing energy or valence to new lines of action (Collins 2004; Frijda
2002).
In addition to its qualities of immediacy, the reciprocal character of the
love relationship fosters concrete, positive reflected appraisals that allow
the individual to see past the contours of the current self, envisioning at
least the broad outline of a more worthy one. These engage self-feelings
(emotions) as well as self-evaluations (cognitions). As the relationship de-
velops, the prosocial spouse acts as an agent of social control, but also as
an ever-present emotional role model and source of social support. Thus,
chronic offenders who affiliate with a prosocial spouse benefit from con-
tinued observation of the spouse’s (emotional) reactions to new situations
and life experiences and from active assistance as they cope with their
own. This adds conceptually to the idea that successful hooks for change
will tend to provide a relatively concrete blueprint for how one is to
proceed as a changed individual. Although we previously conceptualized
this largely in terms of new definitions (a link to the cognitive), the dy-
namics involved in social learning also apply to the emotional realm.
And most fundamentally, a love relationship that elicits positive emo-
tions, buffers negative ones, and fosters a more positive sense of self will
often be experienced as a highly desirable feature of one’s life. Control
theorists emphasize that individuals refrain from engaging in deviant
behavior in order to avoid losing such a valued relationship. A symbolic
interactionist perspective, in contrast, highlights shifts in meaning, as the
relationship and life course that has been forged around it are increasingly
embraced as worthy end points. The positive emotional connection to
19 Miller (1973) and Engdahl (2004) reference a more universal human tendency toward
social coordination that is essentially precognitive and preemotional. Thus the reader
should note that we have shifted the definition of this concept somewhat from their
original formulation in order to highlight interactions and social relations that are on
some level recognized as meaningful by the actor (see e.g., Glaser 1956).
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another serves as a satisfying aspect of life that diminishes feelings of
anger and the desire to search for excitement via crime-centered actions
and affiliations. Over a period of time, role-taking processes within a
loving relationship foster an increasingly other-directed worldview (a pro-
tective, caring stance toward the partner, toward one’s children). These
positive emotional connections further solidify the actor’s changing view
of self and eventually generalize to a wider array of others, including
potential victims.
Unfortunately, the above discussion traces an ideal-typical sequence,
one that depends on a strong emotional connection to the type of con-
ventional romantic partner who is able to make a contribution to the
actor’s emergent view of a different and more “worthy” self. In reality,
chronic offenders, even if so inclined, often face difficulties in locating
prosocial partners. Further, the quality of romantic ties varies consider-
ably, and may deteriorate from an early promising phase (see the discus-
sion of structural disadvantage in the analysis section below). Finally, the
idea of an emotional amplification process necessarily encompasses the
potential for strong bonds to antisocial individuals to have an especially
deleterious effect on the desistance process. Thus, in contrast to a straight-
forward social control perspective (wherein attachment is uniformly the-
orized as beneficial), we expect to find that the emotional valence of the
relationship operates in concert with the partner’s crime level in its effect
on the offender’s own level of criminal involvement.
METHODS
Analytic Strategy and Measures
In order to investigate aspects of this neo-Meadian perspective on emo-
tions, we rely on qualitative and quantitative data sources. Our analysis
of the qualitative data informed the theoretical perspective described
above, and in this article, we draw on life history narratives to illustrate
conceptual categories and mechanisms that are difficult to portray relying
on traditional statistical approaches.20 However, the narrative data do not
allow a formal test of aspects of the theory. In order to investigate as-
sociations more systematically, we rely on data derived from three waves
of structured interviews with a sample of delinquent youth as they have
matured into adulthood. Our objectives are to determine whether vari-
ations in the characteristics of respondents’ emotional lives (here we focus
20 For example, we demonstrate linkages between social, cognitive, and emotional
processes, identify distinct emotional adaptations that would potentially be obscured
by a focus on aggregate trends, and explore a specific “derailment” scenario.
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on anger identity and depression) are related to patterns of adult crimi-
nality, once sociodemographic characteristics, early behavior (reflecting
the idea of a stable trait), and adult social bonds (an emphasis of the age-
graded theory of informal social control) have been taken into account.
We also explore the amplifying role of emotional processes in connection
with romantic partner effects.
We first present primarily cross-sectional results based on the first adult
follow-up conducted in 1995. We assess the relationship between adult
anger identity and three problem outcomes (criminal behavior, relation-
ship violence, and problems resulting from the use of alcohol and drugs)
by estimating ordinary least squares models that include as predictors
basic sociodemographic information (race, gender, age, poverty status),
attachment to spouse/intimate partner, marital status, a measure of em-
ployment circumstances, and prior delinquent history (adolescent delin-
quency was measured during the initial interview in 1982).21 We also
examine whether adult levels of depression are related to these outcomes,
by estimating similar models. Although not a central focus of the current
analysis, our sample characteristics provide the opportunity to explore
the possibility of distinctly gendered mechanisms. Accordingly, gender
interactions are included as a final step in the analyses. A third set of
analyses examines the moderating role of emotion in connection with a
revised social learning approach to “the good marriage effect.” We assess
whether the level of attachment to the spouse/intimate partner influences
the effect of the partner’s criminality by introducing a marital happiness
by partner’s crime interaction term into a model focused on the respon-
dent’s own criminal involvement.
Using data from the 2003 interviews, as well as information derived
from the 1995 follow-up, we estimate models that again focus on these
substantive relationships, but assess the respondent’s pattern of behavior
across a longer span of time. The results of these models should be viewed
as more tentative, due to the smaller number of respondents for whom
both 1995 and 2003 scores on the various problem behavior indices are
available. Nevertheless, this approach does allow a prospective exami-
nation of these processes. We rely on multinomial logistic regression to
distinguish three patterns: respondents who evidenced a consistent pattern
of desistance from crime across both adult waves (desisters), those whose
behavior could be described as more episodic/inconsistent (they report
criminal involvement either in 1995 or 2003, but not across both periods
21 Although relationship violence and drug/alcohol problems are not always in them-
selves “legally actionable,” these are other problem areas that, particularly in adulthood,
frequently figure directly or indirectly into continued difficulties with the law.
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(unstable offenders), and those who evidenced high criminality at both
waves (persistent offenders).
In 1982 we conducted personal interviews with 254 serious adolescent
offenders. This includes the total population of the only state-level insti-
tution for girls in Ohio ( ) and a sample of male adolescents drawnnp 127
from the populations of three institutions ( ).22 In 1995 we at-np 127
tempted to locate all of the respondents who had participated in the
adolescent interviews, and eventually found and interviewed 83% of the
first wave respondents presumed to be alive in 1995 (six were known to
be deceased; ). Respondents at that time were an average 29 yearsnp 210
of age. We recently completed a new wave of interviews (in 2003) with
these respondents, eventually locating 74% ( ) of the sample whonp 153
had participated in the first adult follow-up.23 A logistic regression analysis
comparing those interviewed and not interviewed in 1995 revealed no
significant differences by race, social class, or 1982 delinquency level, but
those interviewed were more likely to be female and somewhat younger
( ) than those not reinterviewed. A total of 109 women and 101P ! .05
men participated in this initial follow up. Analyses focused on the time
3 subsample indicate no significant differences by race, gender, or prior
delinquency involvement, but those reinterviewed in 2003 were somewhat
more likely to be older than those not reinterviewed. All the itmes included
in the scales that follow are shown in appendix A.
Problem Adult Outcomes
Criminal involvement.—Adult crime was measured at both adult inter-
views by a modified version of Elliot, Huizinga, and Ageton’s (1985) self-
22 These youths reported extensive criminal activity during the adolescent interview,
and involvement across a range of offenses exceeded the average levels of delinquency
reported by youths who participated in a comparable neighborhood survey (including
the high-rate offenders in the neighborhood study). For a more detailed description of
the nature and extent of the offense involvement of the original sample of male and
female respondents, see Cernkovich, Giordano, and Pugh (1985).
23 Many respondents within this sample were extremely difficult to track and locate,
due to their marginal and shifting housing arrangements, and, in some cases, desire
to avoid detection due to legal problems. In addition to traditional follow-up procedures
(phone calls, letters, record checks), we relied on a variety of nonstandard techniques.
For example, the interviewer recently located one individual at a Narcotics Anonymous
dance and another after four unsuccessful trips to Dayton. On the fifth trip, the re-
spondent’s sister accompanied the interviewer to 14 different crack houses in the
Dayton area, eventually locating the focal respondent.
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reported delinquency scale.24 The reference period is the last 12 months
(a p .91). The multinomial models rely on three categories of offending
based on both self-report inventories and incarceration histories. Respon-
dents were classified as desisters if they reported a low level or no in-
volvement in crime and were not incarcerated at either wave. Unstable
offenders reported higher levels of involvement or were incarcerated at
one of the waves, and persisters evidenced involvement or incarceration
at both waves.25 The partner’s criminal involvement index was derived
from a similar inventory, also completed by the respondent in 1995, where
the referent is the partner’s criminal activity over the prior 12 month
period (a p .83).26
Perpetration of relationship violence.—A modified version of the con-
flict tactics scale (Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz 1980) is used to assess the
degree to which respondents self-report perpetration of an escalating set
of violent behaviors in the context of a marital or other intimate rela-
tionship ( ). The reference period is the last 12 months. The mul-ap .91
tinomial results rely on a more generic violence subscale, as the intimate
partner violence index was not administered at the time of the 2003 wave
(see app. A). Respondents who reported no serious violent acts at either
24 Items were deleted that would have been inappropriate for this adult sample (i.e.,
status offenses). Each offense was also assigned a ratio-score seriousness weight derived
from the National Survey of Crime Severity, in order to avoid the swamping effect of
reports of frequent involvement in relatively minor offenses (Wolfgang et al. 1985, pp.
46–50).
25 At the second wave, the criminal involvement index ranges from 6.51 to 38.30 with
a mean of 10.79. At the third wave, the range is from 6.51 to 46.94 with a mean of
9.86. For purposes of these analyses, respondents whose score is 8.75 or below are
considered desisters. This reflects either a low rate of involvement in one or two minor
offenses (e.g., being drunk in a public place), or no reported involvement. Using this
classification scheme, 42 (31.1%) are considered persistent offenders, 50 (37%) desisters,
and 43 (31.9%) unstable offenders. We recognize that the multinomial approach is not
ideal. It would be preferable to rely on yearly measures, in order to document crime
patterns more precisely. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that respondents have
offended during the intervals not covered by the self-report inventories. However, this
modeling strategy does provide a longer window of assessment than the cross-sectional
approach. One reviewer also expressed concern that the criminal offender classification
included incarceration status, since criminal justice involvement could relate to system
biases as well as behavior differences. We agree with this point, but are nevertheless
reluctant to consider individuals we interviewed while in prison doing well in terms
of desistance from crime. In addition, the violence and drug analyses help to alleviate
this concern, as they rely exclusively on self-reports, and, as shown below, reveal
generally similar patterns of association.
26 All respondents who named an intimate romantic partner completed this instrument,
whether or not they were currently married to this partner. Analyses shown are not
restricted to married partners, as a majority of the respondents in this highly marginal
sample were not married at the time of either adult follow-up (these circumstances
are discussed further in the results section).
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wave were considered desisters, unstable offenders reported violence at
one wave, and persistent offenders reported at least one serious violent
act at both waves.
Problem use of alcohol and drugs.—The extent of alcohol and/or drug
related problems is assessed in 1995 and 2003 with a modified version of
Jessor and Jessor’s (1977) scale, as revised for use in the National Youth
Survey (Elliott et al. 1985; ) For purposes of the multinomialap .88
models, those desisting from drug and alcohol problems reported scores
below the median on this scale at both waves, unstable respondents scored
above the median at one wave, and persisters reported levels of problem
use above the median at both waves.
Emotional Constructs
Anger identity.—The adult (for the 1995 survey) protocol includes a five-
item scale that taps anger dimensions of the respondent’s emotional self-
concept. This includes items such as “When people say or do something
that hurts me, I usually try to hurt them back,” and “I can be a pretty
mean person” ( ).ap .74
Depression.—To measure the respondent’s current affective state
(1995), we use eight items drawn primarily from the Langner (1962) index,
as described in Mirowsky and Ross (1989). Respondents indicated how
often during the past 12 months they had experienced certain symptoms,
such as feeling “low in spirits” or “wondered if anything is worthwhile”
( ).27ap .84
(Marital/intimate partner) happiness.—We rely on a slightly revised
version of Spanier’s (1976) single-item measure of marital happiness
(1995).28
27 This short instrument is not ideal, but does provide a general index of the respon-
dent’s current level of depressed mood. Depression is conventionally viewed as a
disease or mental disorder, but we see value in considering this as one aspect of the
emotional self’s content. Individuals responding to such interview questions are de-
scribing their current self-relevant feelings and stance toward the outer world. These
can thus be seen as self-processes, but here the referent is feelings of sadness, hope-
lessness, and the like. That depression is known to be deeply influenced by one’s social
circumstances and in turn to influence them also accords with a neo-Meadian per-
spective on this aspect of the actor’s self-feelings and self-evaluations.
28 In a previous analysis (Giordano et al. 2002), we relied on a five-item measure of
attachment to the spouse or partner. While this scale was characterized by acceptable
reliability, it was not significantly related to adult self-reported crime or likelihood of
recent arrests. Consistent with our conceptual focus in this analysis, here we employ
a measure of marital happiness that appears more face valid as capturing an emotional
component of the bond. Respondents are asked to consider the following: “The numbers
on the line (from 1 to 7) represent degrees of happiness in relationships. The middle
point (4) represents the degree of happiness of most relationships. Please tell me which
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Race.—The race variable is dichotomized as white versus African-Amer-
ican ( ).29 Gender and age are also introduced asAfrican-Americanp 1
controls in the multivariate models, and models include a dummy variable
for poverty status in 1995. This variable indexes whether respondent re-
ports a total household income at or below the $10,000–$17,999 range.
In 1995, the poverty line for a family of four was $15,000.
Delinquency.—Adolescent involvement in delinquency is measured by
the 27-item version of the Elliott et al. (1985) scale administered as a part
of the adolescent interview in 1982 ( ).ap .92
Adolescent drug and alcohol use (two items from the larger delinquency
scale) is used as a control in models focused on adult drug and alcohol
problems.
Occupational prestige.—Aside from our interest in marital or relation-
ship happiness, a further measure of the quality of adult social bonds is
an occupational prestige ranking that classifies the respondent’s occu-
pation, as reported in 1995, ranging from executives, administrators, and
managers (coded 7) to service workers and laborers (coded 1 in both cases).
Marital status.—Marital status in 1995 is also included in the models
( ).marriedp 1
Qualitative Analysis
In 1995, we elicited open-ended life history narratives from 97 women
and 83 men in the sample. The narratives consist of tape recorded in-
terviews conducted in most instances immediately following the com-
pleted structured protocol at wave 2. Although this analysis of emotional
processes primarily focuses on the lengthy 1995 interviews, we also draw
on the new 2003 open-ended interviews to provide a window on how
these respondents have fared over the years, since the original life history
narrative was elicited.30
number best describes the level of happiness, all things considered, of your relationship
with your spouse/partner or girl or boyfriend.” Responses range from 1 (extremely
unhappy) to 7 (perfect).
29 Those in the “other race” category are omitted from the quantitative analyses due
to the small number in this group, but these respondents are included in the narrative
analysis. Results are generally similar when we estimated models using the larger
“nonwhite” sample as a contrast.
30 For a more detailed description of our general approach to the life histories, see
Giordano et al. (2002); more detail about the analysis of emotional processes is included
in app. B.
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EMOTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS NOT TIED TO MAJOR ROLE
TRANSITIONS
A Diminution of Negative Emotions
Consistent with prior research on desistance, we observe declines in crim-
inal involvement over the three waves of interviews, as these delinquent
youths have matured into adulthood.31 The life stories elicited at the time
of the initial adult interview encompassed a range of topics, but centered
on the basic question of how respondents were doing, focusing on crime
and well-being more broadly defined. Nevertheless, many narratives even-
tually reached back to the childhood and adolescent years, as respondents
attempted to provide answers to this question. The frequent references
to emotions associated with childhood experiences illustrates in a general
way, then, that these dynamics may be important not only to an under-
standing of onset processes, but to the process of desisting as well. These
life histories support Agnew’s (1992) central focus on anger, as this emotion
is frequently mentioned as respondents provide their own accounts of the
character of “the early years.” While we cannot rule out biological expla-
nations, or the idea that negative emotionality is a personality trait (Agnew
et al. 2002), these data highlight that many of these reactions and feelings
do appear to have strong social underpinnings. And consistent with our
focus on identification processes, the family appears as a frequent site
wherein the angry self develops and solidifies:
My dad [was very abusive to mom] in front of me, throw food at her. . . .
We used to have to sleep in closets and stuff to hide from him. . . . I
remember sleeping in the closet when I was about seven.—Greg
I think I was in the second grade and a boy pushed me down . . . and I
went home crying, . . . saying that he beat me up and all this and I re-
member my Aunt Juanita . . . picked me up and she said what he did to
you is not half of what I’m going to do to you, . . . and she beat me up
and she said you better do that to him. So I went back the next day and
I beat him up. And I just kept doing it and doing it. And they [mother and
aunt] would show me how to fight and how to get better.—Stephanie
[It was] like the evil stepmother . . . beat me when dad wasn’t around. It
was like Cinderella. I was too small [to fight back], . . . too scared.—Eric
These excerpts do provide support for a social learning perspective, but
the traditional emphasis on learning “definitions favorable to law viola-
tions” does not adequately reflect the child’s emotional response to many
of these unfortunate family circumstances. Thus, these discussions of the
31 For a more thorough analysis of aggregate trends, see Schroeder (2005).
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early years often include emotional reactions as an integral aspect and
consequence of this learning process (Hell no I didn’t sit there. I left.
Pissed me off. Got hot under the collar . . . pissed off and left). Yet in
spite of the negative, aversive qualities of many of these early experiences,
the respondents’ comments as adults sometimes reflect changes in reac-
tions to what were—during childhood and adolescence—quite ‘”logically”
experienced as extremely distressing, and ultimately anger-eliciting social
experiences. This relates to the first developmental shift with implications
for desistance processes, namely, a diminution of the negative emotions
originally connected to criminal activity:
Now I have a better relationship with my mother. I know at the time I
was 14 and 15 years old I really had resentments with my mother, and she
worked two jobs so I really couldn’t bond with my mother, build no re-
lationship and I really had a resentment with my mother for that, but I
thought it was her fault that my father wasn’t there. . . . So I pretty much
blamed my mother for everything. But today we have a better relationship
and I know she was doing the best she could with what she had.—Kim
I always felt like I was neglected like I didn’t have someone there, like my
dad and mom . . . only gradually realized they [grandparents who raised
him] were trying to make up for the loss. They were trying to be our parents.
There was a lot of caring there that we didn’t realize when we were growing
up. And we just didn’t realize it.—Gary
This idea of an emotional mellowing is consistent with other findings
from our structured data. In response to a direct question about the nature
of the respondent’s current relationship with their mother, a majority of
those in this chronic offender sample (62.9%) reported an improvement
from the adolescent period.32 Respondents do not necessarily connect this
emotional mellowing process to traditionally measured life course events
or even to changes in the behavior of the individuals involved. These
emotional changes described above can thus be considered a develop-
mental process that can take place alongside or even absent key turning
points and transitions (consistent with our notion of secondary desistance
mechanisms).
Analysis of all of the life histories suggests a further complication: A
subgroup of the respondents has apparently achieved a more satisfactory
diminution of negative emotions by further distancing themselves (emo-
tionally, physically, or both) from these familial bonds:
32 Respondents were asked: “How have your relationships with your parents changed
since you were a teenager? As a starting point, would you say you feel less close, about
the same, or closer to your mother (or the person who raised you) since then?” Possible
responses were less close, about the same, or closer.
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I spent years trying to make her be a mother to me, trying to understand
why she didn’t want to be a mother to me. Now I don’t care. We have no
relationship. A mother is someone that is there no matter what. . . . And
it took me years to actually just accept it and to deal with it. But you cannot
make someone be what they had no intention of being. . . . She had no
intention of being a mother.—Sheryl
While the family of origin has been incorporated into virtually all theories
of delinquency, these relationships have largely been ignored when it
comes to theorizing about factors associated with delinquents’ patterns
of adult adjustment. Yet these family members do continue to mature
along with respondents, and are arguably less disposable than earlier peer
contacts. Thus changes in the character or at least intensity of negative
feelings associated with these familial bonds may be one important social
dynamic that influences the desistance process.
A Diminution of Positive Emotions Connected to Crime
As described at the outset, Katz (1988) contributed significantly to our
understanding of crime by focusing on its positive, sensate qualities. This
adds to the roster of emotions that come to be associated with criminal
activity. If the “early years” narratives referenced only frightening or an-
ger-inducing incidents such as those described above, the individual would
be left with a view of self as a rather hapless, pathetic victim. This is
often not the case, as these descriptions of respondents’ attitudes toward
their early criminal involvement reflect:
It’s like, “Come on Betsy, we’re going to go here!” and . . . it’s like I don’t
want to miss a party.—Betsy
It was like a rush, you know, let’s see what we can do today and get away
with.—Kristen
It excited me to do different things . . . to see what I could and what I
couldn’t get away with.—Paul
Me and my friends, . . . we’d sit around and giggle about [the news reports
on houses we burglarized] . . . like, them motherfuckers just don’t know
who it is.—Steve
While the life stories contain considerable evidence of childhood vic-
timization, then, these examples suggest that youths nevertheless were
able to carve out a more active, positive sense of self as they described
themselves as a partier, a risk taker, or a rebel. As part of this process,
respondents may have imbued some of the apparent causes of crime as
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well as crime itself with these positive meanings. For example, while
Rhonda believed that peer influence was an important factor that led to
her delinquency involvement, she nevertheless actively cultivated a friend-
ship with a delinquent companion she described as more exciting than
her square friend Jackie: “Sunshine seemed more exciting than Jackie.
She always had new clothes, money, boys around her. Even though Jackie
was prettier, Sunshine was more popular. It was the thrill to be with
Sunshine because she received more attention from other people.”
These social connections are important, as role taking with friends
fosters crime-relevant emotions (the thrill, the rush, the fun of sitting
around and giggling about it) as well as providing the social context for
actually carrying out delinquent activity. Sections of the narratives con-
cerning the adult years do not contain many references to the excitement
connected with nonconformity or the criminal lifestyle. Almost by defi-
nition a chronic offender will have been involved in crime scenes, fights,
and drug-related social experiences (and frequently extensive fallout from
them) many times over in the intervening years (Shover 1985, p. 90).
These changes in the way the deviant lifestyle is experienced emotionally
as well as cognitively can provide a backdrop for making further and
more forward-looking life changes:
When I was a teenager, life was just a big party. It wasn’t you know I
didn’t have no responsibilities . . . I acted on impulse—everything I did
was impulse—you know and today if I could go back I would have been
more serious about life then, because I just can’t act on impulse today, you
know a lot of things I did then was real stupid, it was just stupid, experiment
with different things, different drugs, and that was crazy.—Donna
First, Donna’s comments are not consistent with the stable trait view
of impulsivity and low self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990), be-
cause this respondent clearly references temporal changes in this regard.
Donna believes that she is now much less likely to act on impulse than
during her teen years, and her low self-reported criminal involvement
and lack of recent official arrests serve to substantiate the desister sto-
ryline. Nor does Sampson and Laub’s modified control theory (1993)
provide a comprehensive explanation here, in that the changes she ref-
erences do not tie back in a straightforward way to the influence of new
bonds she has acquired (Donna was not married at the time of this follow-
up). Further, the idea that there is a relatively constant motivation to
deviate held in check by informal controls does not seem consistent with
Donna’s apparent shift in perspective. Instead, this narrative highlights
that emotional dynamics that originally connect to criminal involvement
can change significantly over the life course. In some instances these
emotional transformations may be associated with life-altering role-based
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changes (i.e., the “good marriage effect”), but may also occur as a result
of a more gradual developmental process.
Increased Skill in Emotion Management
We have suggested that a diminution of negative as well as positive
emotions (connected to crime) can be generally helpful to the desistance
process. However, actors may also develop in their abilities to regulate
emotions in socially acceptable ways. As suggested at the outset, this idea
of emotion management highlights the distinction between emotions as
actually experienced and as accommodated or displayed to others (Hochs-
child 1979). Both types of changes (experience vs. management) engage
identity processes, as the more mature actor not only constructs a self
that is less angry, and less enamored of the criminal lifestyle but one more
able to “manage” emotions; that is, to cope:
When I was younger and I was so unhappy, really I didn’t know the source
of it. . . . Today I’m a little more able to pinpoint the source of my un-
happiness. So therefore I can kind of work with it and not allow it to
consume me . . . not allow it to just control everything.—Lisa
These narrative excerpts indicate that the respondents believe they have
changed significantly in their capacities to directly manipulate their emo-
tions. Such changes include an increased ability to manage original sources
of stress, but also to cope with new social situations and life problems
that inevitably appear on the horizon. The narratives reflect for some an
increased sense of agency with respect to the emotional realm (I can
control it, I can work with it), and may reference specific coping strategies
respondents come to believe are helpful to them:
Uh, usually I call my mom and then after talking with her, I’ll call Patrick
and talk with him. We’re kinda in the same financial situation. He’s got
he’s goin’ through some problems with his work too, which workman’s
comp is tryin’ to deny his claim and stuff. . . . Other times I just go for a
walk, then come back.—Craig
I can go and talk to them [friends], if I got problems, you know I go and
talk to them. They give me advice, try to help me out any way they can.
. . . Yea, let’s go walk around the wilderness center, let’s go to the new
high school and swim, you know, play golf not let’s go get drunk and you
know cause problems and see if we can find somebody to beat up. —Larry
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Mechanisms underlying These Developmental Changes
Above we outlined three areas of developmental change that have im-
plications for understanding general declines in criminality, as respondents
have matured into adulthood. While these narrative excerpts suggest the
importance of these shifts in feeling, we do not have access to the myriad
of social situations that may have literally produced these types of trans-
formations. It is reasonable to argue, however, that the wider social arena
of adulthood, changing network affiliations, and time itself provide ad-
ditional role-taking opportunities. For example, Craig suggested that now
he often works things through with his friend Patrick, who is going
through some of the same problems with “worker’s comp,” or calls his
mom, with whom he now has developed a better relationship.33 Some-
times, the same friends previously implicated in delinquent actions, in the
adult years reinforce more socially productive coping (Now we go out
hunting). Finally, actors may benefit from prior experience within their
own lives, as previous social situations have evoked negative reactions
from others and demonstrated costly lessons about emotions and their
management. This type of learning too involves role-taking processes.
Although these changes relate to the social and emotional realms of
experience, cognitive transformations are important underpinnings of
these related changes. For example, Kim suggested that she experiences
less resentment toward her mother at least in part because she now knows
she was doing the best she could with what she had. Gary now believes
that there was a lot of caring there that we didn’t realize, and recognizes
that going out and getting drunk or looking for someone to beat up were
not particularly effective coping strategies. Donna’s narrative reflects a
different attitude toward herself (an identity shift), as she describes herself
as one who can’t act on impulse today. In addition, Donna has redefined
drugs and the party lifestyle as stupid and crazy, a cognitive transfor-
mation that is consistent with our previous focus on “changes in the
meaning and desirability of the deviant behavior,” but that links directly
to the emotional realm. This buttresses our notion that emotions and
cognitions are deeply interconnected, and that sustained behavioral
change is more likely when social, cognitive, and emotional processes align
in ways that facilitate the desistance process.
33 Parents are a generation older; hence they may be even farther along in terms of
emotional mellowing and their own associated behavioral changes.
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VARIATIONS IN THE EMOTIONAL SELF: LINKS TO PERSISTENCE/
DESISTANCE
Anger Identity
We can also see the interplay of the cognitive, social, and emotional realms
through examples within the life histories that are contrary to the prospect
of change. Even though developmental changes are referenced often in
the narratives, and may be associated with overall age-related declines
in criminality, respondents vary significantly in access to social networks
that tend to facilitate these emotional transformations, as well as in cog-
nitive and emotional openness to change. Sandra put it quite simply: I’m
real violent towards men. I’ve got a real [anger] control problem. I think
men are dogs. This short example, while not reflective of change, does
nevertheless illustrate several aspects of our theoretical perspective. San-
dra’s views of self reflect neither a basic openness to change nor receptivity
to a relevant hook for change (perhaps counseling, certainly a marriage
prospect), two areas we described in our previous analysis of the impor-
tance of cognitive transformations. However, in this example, it is clear
that Sandra is not merely describing a cognition-behavior link—here emo-
tion is also very much part of the equation. For Sandra, certain entrenched
cognitive representations about men (she thinks they are dogs) link to her
negative emotions and self-views (as an individual with an anger control
problem), and both emotional and cognitive processes are intimately con-
nected to the persistence of her negative behavior patterns (violence). The
narrative data highlight that from the actor’s own point of view, this
identity has meaning and is a recognizable feature of the self. That is,
the anger identity fits well with and incorporates aspects of the early years
(in Sandra’s case the past includes several highly aversive contacts with
men), current social experiences (Sandra avoids relationships with men
and currently has a lesbian partner), and methods for handling future
problem situations.
Table 1 presents results of analyses that explore these connections more
systematically, by examining patterns of variation across the sample as a
whole. Using first the results of the 1995 adult interview, we examine the
association between respondents’ anger identities and three problem adult
outcomes. Table 1 shows a significant association between anger identity
and level of self-reported involvement in adult criminal behavior. These
findings are significant net of sociodemographic controls, other traditional
predictors of desistance (measures of adult social bonds), and remain sig-
nificant when an index of prior delinquent involvement is introduced (see
model 2). In addition, we observe a significant association between anger
identity and self-reports of violence perpetration, and this association also
remains significant in the full model. Finally, a significant relationship
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exists between anger identity and problems resulting from alcohol and
drug use. This finding is of particular interest, since a relationship to
crime but especially violence is more straightforward (particularly when
relying on cross-sectional data, the latter could be seen as containing a
somewhat tautological element). It is important to highlight that early
delinquency (in the crime and violence models) and drug and alcohol use
(in the problem drug use model) do not completely account for these
associations, suggesting that this view of self is not simply a marker for
a behavioral propensity. In each of these models, reported happiness with
the intimate partner is inversely related to scores on these problem out-
comes, in a manner consistent with Sampson and Laub’s (1993) control
theory. Marital status is not, however, a significant predictor.34 It is also
important to note that gender by anger identity interaction terms included
in each of the models were not significant (results not shown). This in-
dicates a similar effect of anger identity on women and men’s self-reports
of criminal involvement, perpetration of violence, and problem use of
alcohol and drugs.35
Table 2 presents results assessing patterns of crime over a longer period
of time. Focusing on the theoretically strongest contrast (desistance vs.
persistence), we find that anger identity significantly decreases the odds
of being a stable desister. In addition, this focal variable is significantly
related to unstable offending (those who evidenced crime at one but not
both follow-up interviews) as a contrast with desistance. The third con-
trast compares those who have had some adult problems with crime
(unstable) with those evidencing a consistent pattern of adult crime (per-
sistent offenders), and results are in the hypothesized direction but are
34 Race is significantly related to adult crime and problems resulting from drug/alcohol
use. Being female is inversely related to level of self-reported criminal involvement
and remains so in the full model. Gender is not a significant predictor of reports of
relationship violence or problem drug/alcohol use in this sample group. In these models,
poverty status is not significant as a predictor of the various outcomes, and occupational
prestige is similarly not significant. The latter results likely stem from the very low
socioeconomic standing of the majority of these respondents (here poverty and eco-
nomic hardship are more accurately viewed as constants than variables—see the dis-
cussion of structural disadvantage below). Adolescent delinquency explains additional
variance in the crime model, and early substance use in the problem drug and alcohol
model.
35 Ogle et al. (1995) have suggested that women lack a well-developed vocabulary of
anger, due to their early socialization. Because of this, violence by women, especially
homicide incidents, often erupts in a single outburst, reflecting an extreme solution to
(for example) prior extensive, repeated abuse. Our research with this serious offender
sample suggests that while victimization experiences are often important underpinnings
of the anger identity, this more stable self-view contributes further to a range of adult
difficulties. Prior behavior (time 1 delinquency) is also a significant predictor of crime
and problems associated with drug and alcohol use for women and men in this sample.
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not significant. Kim is similarly related to the desistance vs. persistence
and desistance vs. unstable contrasts in offending patterns.36 We also
estimated models that gauge the impact of anger identity on long-term
patterns of violence. Higher levels of anger identity significantly decrease
the odds of being in the stable nonviolent category (desisters) relative to
the stable violent offending group (persisters), and also distinguish the
unstable from nonviolent desister patterns (see app. table C1). The results
for drug and alcohol problems (see app. table C2) are similar to the crime
findings depicted in table 2: anger identity influences the odds of being
in the low-rate desister category of self-reported problem use as a contrast
with a consistent pattern of reporting such problems, and also significantly
predicts desistance compared with a more unstable pattern. Anger identity
does not, however, distinguish the unstable vs. persistent patterns. Gender
by anger identity interactions are not significant in any of the multinomial
models.37
Laura’s narrative is quite congruent with the results described above,
but provides a concrete illustration of ways in which past, present, and
future have combined to solidify and maintain a particular view of self—
one that has meaning, but that appears likely to eventuate in further
problems over the long haul. According to our neo-Meadian theory, this
involves consequential role-taking processes, self-feelings, and associated
self evaluations:
I’m not gonna go out there and look for trouble, try to pick up a fight with
someone. But if I’m pushed to the point that you know, like backed in the
corner or you know . . . if they’re running their mouth when they shouldn’t
be . . . I’ve just gotten to the point where, you know, its “hey, I’m not
lettin’ people run over me no more,” and if it comes down that I have to
fight, then so be it. I mean that’s not really a good way to feel, but the
lifestyle that I had to live, I mean it come to the point of, if it comes to me
or someone else, you know, then it’s gonna be somebody else, it ain’t gonna
be me.38—Laura
Laura described herself in this manner at the time of the 1995 interview.
36 In these models, race is negatively related to desistance as a contrast with both the
persistence and unstable patterns, while being female is significant in the strongest
comparison (desister vs. persister). Adolescent delinquency is significantly related to
desistance in the same contrast, and also distinguishes unstable from persistent
offenders.
37 We note also that while anger identity is significantly associated with 1995 scores
and predicts these offense patterns (using 1995 and 2003 scores), the anger measure
is not a significant predictor of the 2003 self-reports per se.
38 The self-description that Laura offers is also consistent with Anderson’s (1999) de-
piction of worldviews that develop in highly disadvantaged neighborhoods—see the
discussion of structural disadvantage below.
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When we located this respondent again in connection with the more recent
follow-up, she had indeed encountered many additional life course dif-
ficulties. Marital conflict and violence were key issues, culminating in
divorce from her husband Big Jim, loss of her trailer, and, due to housing
problems, for a time the loss of custody of her children. Although Big
Jim appeared to be a source of many of Laura’s difficulties, this aversive
relationship (along with many others) likely contributed to Laura’s own
angry worldview. In turn, this view of self did not end with her divorce.
For example, Laura indicated that she and her son Little Jim often get
in serious fights, but also noted that if they sit down and smoke marijuana
together, this tends to keep such disagreements from escalating.
Depression
Table 3 presents results of analyses in which the adult problem outcomes
are regressed on levels of self-reported depression, along with the de-
mographic and bonding variables, and prior delinquency. In the cross-
sectional results, the association between depression and total adult crime
level is significant, but inclusion of prior delinquency in the model atten-
uates its effect. This indicates that respondents who reported higher levels
of delinquency at the adolescent interview have elevated scores on de-
pression in adulthood that are in turn associated with higher adult crime
levels. It is interesting to note that marital happiness is not a significant
predictor in this model that takes level of depression into account, even
prior to the introduction of the control for adolescent delinquency. This
indicates that depression can be viewed as a mediator of the previously
observed marital happiness–crime association. Analyses described in table
3 also indicate a significant association between depression and relation-
ship violence perpetration, as well as problem use of alcohol and drugs,
net of the various controls, and these associations remain significant when
prior delinquency or early drug use are included in the models. In these
models, marital happiness remains a significant predictor.39 Interaction
results (gender by depression) also indicate a generally similar association
for women and men between depression and the perpetration of rela-
tionship violence, as well as problem use of alcohol and drugs. However,
a depression by gender interaction in the criminal involvement model is
39 In these models race is significantly related to crime and problem drug/alcohol use,
and being male is also a significant predictor of these outcomes.
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significant. In this sample group, symptoms of depression and self-re-
ported crime are significantly related for men but not women.40
Table 4 presents the results of multinomial regressions estimating the
effect of depression on offending patterns over the longer span of time.
Depression decreases the odds of desistance as compared to persistence
(the strongest contrast) and also distinguishes desisters from the unstable
offender group; this index does not, however, distinguish the persistent
from unstable offenders. Further, these self-reports of depressed mood in
1995 do not distinguish any of the violent offending patterns, viewed over
the longer period, or the alcohol/drug use patterns we assessed (results
not shown). Depression by gender interactions are not significant in these
multinomial models.
While feelings of depression are not in themselves as strongly predictive
of the full roster of problem outcomes, these self-feelings are nevertheless
usefully theorized as a part of a package of emotional disadvantages that
may be limiting to some offenders’ desistance efforts.41 Laub and Samp-
son’s (2003) recent work concludes that persistent offenders they inter-
viewed tended to lead lives marked by considerable instability and lack
of structure. The lack of solid relationships that provide control and sup-
port in turn were associated with continued difficulties. Although these
are important observations, as suggested at the outset, Laub and Samp-
son’s theorizing does not provide a full understanding of why it is that
some individuals but not others are able to forge and/or maintain stable
marital ties and take full advantage of available job opportunities. One
explanation stresses that both crime and the lack of adult bonds are
reflections of an underlying stable trait or propensity (Gottfredson and
Hirschi 1990), a line of reasoning that is at odds with Sampson and Laub’s
own life course framework and our symbolic interactionist version of it.
The depression findings reported above highlight that negative affective
40 The direction of this interaction is somewhat unexpected, given the gendered nature
of depression and prior research that emphasizes the problem of co-occurring “dis-
orders” among samples of women offenders (Robins 1966). It is important to underscore
that the women’s rates of depression in this sample are generally high, but that here
we find a stronger connection to crime in the case of male offenders. This finding is
exploratory, given the small sample size, but may reflect that for these women, negative
affective states are associated with a variety of different life conditions, only one of
which is related to their criminal involvement. Nevertheless, this intriguing result
warrants additional scrutiny using larger longitudinal data sets, and the positive as-
sociations across the three types of problem outcomes provide a practical rationale for
addressing the mental health needs of serious male as well as female offenders.
41 A potentially useful direction for future research would be to explore in more detail
particular combinations of emotions (e.g., high anger along with high levels of de-
pression) and to assess how these differentially influence persistence and desistance
processes.
This content downloaded from 129.1.62.221 on Thu, 10 Oct 2013 19:18:13 PM















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This content downloaded from 129.1.62.221 on Thu, 10 Oct 2013 19:18:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Emotions and Crime
1637
states may be one of the important and potentially malleable background
elements limiting the actor’s ability to benefit from “hooks for change”
that may be available within the environment. Given the highly disad-
vantaged positions of many offenders, the idea of completely reshaping
their lives appears to some a daunting and potentially demoralizing chal-
lenge. Jana, quoted below, for example, expresses a level of resignation
that connects emotional and cognitive processes in a narrative that does
not reveal much hope for substantial change. We interviewed Jana in a
friend’s apartment, where she had been sleeping on the couch since her
release from prison. Asked about her well-being, she replied:
Jana: Sometimes I’m happy, sometimes I’m depressed. Mostly depressed.
Q: What depresses you?
Jana: Um, mostly now because, since I lost my apartment . . . since I got
out of jail . . . finding somewhere to stay . . . um cause I’m use to having
my own [apartment]. That’s what I was doing today . . . calling around
for an apartment . . . I don’t really see no future for myself . . . ‘cause
I just take it day by day. . . . I don’t plan things.
Q: Ah, so do you see yourself working . . . or what . . . or what do you
want to do?
Jana: I can’t see myself like that.
While many individuals in this sample have experienced multiple, over-
lapping life difficulties, some narratives also incorporated more positive,
optimistic themes. In Jana’s case, however, she expressly states a view of
self that is inconsistent with a forward looking, positive approach (I don’t
plan things). Our prior emphasis on cognitions seems appropriate, as
thought processes are obviously an important part of the mix of influences
(Jana notes that she cannot conceive of herself in the role of a working
person). Yet her feelings of depression and of being overwhelmed are also
part of an emotional self-view that may further limit her ability to take
any kind of efficacious individual action (see also Shover’s discussion of
despair, [1985, pp. 132–37]). In short, the idea of openness to change and
receptivity to various hooks for change needs to encompass emotional as
well as cognitive dimensions of these world and self-views. When we
located Jana in connection with the 2003 interview, she was again in-
carcerated, serving time for drug possession and child endangerment. This
respondent’s updated narrative reflects an even greater sense of hope-
lessness and resignation, as Jana candidly states that she does not plan
to give up drinking, may well use cocaine in the future, and does not rule
out the possibility of experiencing additional prison time.
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DESISTANCE AS A FUNCTION OF ROLE-BASED CHANGES:
EMOTIONAL MECHANISMS
The emphasis above on fairly subtle emotional processes stems from a
theoretical interest in the subjective realms of experience, but it also has
been influenced by the nature of the life course circumstances of the
respondents who have participated in this longitudinal investigation.
While a majority of the Glueck men Sampson and Laub studied went on
to marry, and often spent their entire adult lives married to the same
individual (Laub and Sampson 2003), a minority of the OLS offenders
reported being married in 1995 (32%), and only 8% indicated that they
were married at both waves of the adult interview (covering, on average,
a span of nine years).42 These realities provide additional context for the
current finding that marital status is not significantly related to self-re-
ported criminal involvement whether viewed cross-sectionally or longi-
tudinally. To illustrate, 9% of the desisters, 4% of the persisters, and 12%
of the unstable offenders report being married at both waves.
Within the context of this contemporary and more heterogeneous sam-
ple, then, the transition to marriage does not on its own provide us with
a comprehensive framework for understanding life course continuities and
changes in criminal behavior. Although the sample size is relatively mod-
est, the design of the current study is in basic respects similar to that
employed by the Gluecks, as it focuses on respondents originally incar-
cerated in an institution for delinquent youths. Yet our data provide a
stark contrast to Laub and Sampson’s portrait of the later lives of juvenile
offenders, and in turn the character of the change process. Fundamental
transformations in the nature and stability of marriage, a lack of job
opportunities for young people with low levels of education and a criminal
history (almost 90% of the OLS offenders do not have a high school
diploma), along with the marginalizing effects of involvement in drug-
oriented lifestyles (see e.g., Uggen and Thompson 2003) have created a
much different adult landscape—one that serves to limit, at least for this
type of sample, the reach and stabilizing potential of “the good marriage
effect.”
Yet our critique of current treatments of desistance extends beyond the
call to consider dynamics that are somewhat independent of transition
events, and the low base rate of occurrence of these events. Although
marriage is less likely and less reliable as a route to desistance for indi-
viduals in this sample, many respondents have nevertheless been signif-
icantly influenced by romantic partners. Our contention is that even when
42 Obviously, a smaller number of respondents in this subset report (a) being married
to the same partner, (b) with whom they have developed a relatively consistent, high-
quality bond, and (c) that is in turn supported by adequate economic resources.
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we focus on the conceptually well-traveled terrain of the “good marriage
effect,” attention to the emotions adds to our understanding of partner
effects. First, according to our neo-Meadian theory, role taking that gives
rise to positive emotional transformations requires a social situation char-
acterized by functional identification as well as difference (Engdahl 2004).
Chronic offenders thus face the difficult task not only of locating a po-
tential partner with whom they feel a certain connection, but whose own
lifestyle is sufficiently different (the contrast notion) that it is likely to be
associated with new motivation and direction. A rather large number of
narratives reflect the presence of identification with partners, but not the
important element of contrast.
George, for example, had an extensive arrest record, and was incar-
cerated at the time of the first adult follow-up. George described his
relationship with his former girlfriend as storybook shit when we was out
there, and was excited that she had recently begun writing him regularly:
I already got plans with the band. . . . I’m going to Florida, I’m definitely
going to see my daughter and I’m definitely going to stay out of prison.
. . . I’m in school; I’m making excellent grades . . . and uh I’m doing
good and I’m hearing from my old lady right. But while the other aspects
of his blueprint for change appeared promising, it did not appear that
his love for Monica would prove helpful to the desistance process. George
indicated that the last time he had actually seen Monica was when he
had visited her in jail, where she was serving time for an aggravated
attempted murder charge. When we finally located George in 2003, he
had again been arrested and incarcerated, this time for parole violations.
George had spent the entire time on the outside with Monica, who had,
during the period of his prior incarceration, developed an addiction to
heroin. This was particularly unfortunate, as George had previously been
a heroin addict, a problem he had successfully surmounted: She kept
telling me, if you want to do it, we can do it together . . . and I’m like
no we don’t. I don’t want to do that shit man. If you don’t see what its
doing to us now then you’re never going to see it. George’s more recent
life history account makes clear that his continued legal difficulties do
not all trace back to his relationship with Monica. Nevertheless, it is
equally apparent that this strong emotional tie does not provide a strong
foundation for making significant life changes.
Some respondents have clearly been influenced in a positive way by
partners: for those respondents who have managed to develop a positive
emotional connection to a traditional, prosocial other, this liaison fosters
an emotional “openness,” a new beginning and strong relationship basis
for developing a different lifestyle, and, in time, a more satisfying re-
placement self (see Wells and Stryker 1988). As Deb put it, Something
about him that makes me want to do the things I should have before. He
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makes me feel like somebody that can accomplish something. As we sug-
gested at the outset, the emotional aspects of a romantic relationship are
available early on and can usefully be theorized as providing motivation
for new lines of action (Collins 2004).43 These relatively new feelings about
the other and the self are in place prior to the buildup of investments in
the relationship that necessarily accrue over a longer period of time. We
also suggested that after the early crossing-over period, the prosocial
spouse acts as an ever-available emotional role model, as well as a source
of informal social control. The narrative data do provide some support
for this general idea. For example, Laura described her husband John:
He’s a real calm guy. I’m the violent one, and he’s really calm. He can
take a lot. Jada, who had also made significant lifestyle changes, developed
a similar contrast theme: He is the total opposite of me—He’s very quiet
and calm and doesn’t make really rash decisions so some of that has worn
off on me.
The positive reflections deriving from a generally compatible but more
highly prosocial partner offer a glimpse of a more worthy self, and the
ongoing process of role taking with such an individual demonstrates a
different style of coping. The spouse can also function more directly as a
source of social support, as actors cope with their own constantly changing
and potentially stressful life circumstances. The quote below nicely illus-
trates how, for a subset of the respondents, all of these positive emotional
connections coalesce to solidify the new prosocial direction. Colleen re-
flects on her own intimate relationship:
He means a whole lot to me, he’s like my own little comfort zone. We have
a real good understanding, a real good relationship with one another. He’s
a wonderful father, not perfect yet, but I’m working on it. What I love
about him most is his warm heart. He’s got a huge heart, he cares about
everything and everybody. He helps me out when I’m down by just allowing
me to share with him whatever I’m going through, it means a lot to me
because I know even if he can’t do anything about the situation he’ll listen.
Lots of times that’s all it takes for me is to just talk something through, to
come up with a solution. So him just being there to listen does so much
for me.
This quote is generally supportive of Sampson and Laub’s (1993) social
control perspective—individuals may refrain from engaging in criminal
acts because they do not wish to lose such a valued relationship. Shame
43 In line with a traditional learning perspective, these associations also provide a
blueprint for how to proceed—a social/cognitive process we emphasized in our previous
analysis. However the cognitive emphasis does not tap the full complement of mech-
anisms underlying the good marriage effect. Indeed, in our view emotions are at the
center of the change process.
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and imagined shame are also undoubtedly involved (Braithwaite 1989).
Yet the idea of being held in check from doing what one would otherwise
do (Sampson and Laub 1993), altering one’s routine activities (Horney,
Osgood, and Marshall 1995), or learning new prosocial definitions (Gior-
dano et al. 2002) does not appear to fully capture all of the mechanisms
that underlie Colleen’s description of her “good marriage effect.” This
narrative excerpt serves to highlight that emotional feelings are integral
to the transformation process. Colleen’s life has changed significantly from
the “early years,” and her relationship provides a significant source of
social support. But even more fundamentally, the positive emotional con-
nections within the relationship help her to shape and sustain a different
view of self and others (his huge heart opens up her heart). This social
relationship is extremely rewarding and fulfilling and replaces drug use
and crime as a source of positive meanings. Eventually, this facilitates a
more other-directed worldview, one that is a significant part of her identity
transformation (He’s a wonderful father, not perfect yet, but I’m working
on it). We note that at the latest adult follow-up, Colleen was still happily
married, referred to her husband in warm and complimentary ways, and
experienced no legal difficulties or problems related to drug/alcohol abuse.
Table 5 explores the amplifying role of relationship emotions (happiness)
in combination with the partner’s criminal behavior more systematically,
relying on the larger sample who participated in the first adult follow-up
interview. We estimate models that regress adult crime on the partner’s
level of criminal involvement as well as marital happiness. In the base
model, we note that the partner’s criminal involvement is a significant
predictor, and also attenuates the previously observed effect of marital
happiness on the respondent’s own level of self-reported criminal activ-
ity.44 This general pattern corresponds well with the focus in prior work
on the partner’s criminality (an emphasis within social learning theory)
rather than the level of bonding to the partner (the social control emphasis;
see also Simons et al. 2002). Yet traditional regression procedures inap-
propriately pit one variable against the other. According to the logic of
our theorizing here, marital happiness may moderate the effect of the
partner’s criminality. The complete model adds the interaction, and results
indicate that it is significant. That is, the criminality of the spouse/partner
is strongly related to the partner’s own criminal involvement, but this
effect varies depending on the level of happiness that characterizes the
relationship. Regardless of level of marital happiness, partner crime re-
mains a significant predictor, but the effect is weakest at low levels of
happiness, and strongest at the highest levels of perceived happiness. This
finding is generally supportive of our notion that positive feelings for the
44 A gender by happiness interaction term is not significant.
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TABLE 5
Self-Reported Adult Crime Regressed on Partner’s Criminal




Model 1 Model 2
Sociodemographic characteristics:
Race (African-American p 1) . . . . . . . . . . .246*** .253***
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .002 .012
Gender (female p 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 .102
Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000 .010
Adult social bonds:
Currently married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .052 .069
Marital happiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0896 .077
Occupational prestige . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .055 .057
Criminality within social network:
Partner’s criminal involvement . . . . . . . . .427*** .502***
Adolescent behavior:
Adolescent delinquency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200** .179**
Interaction:
Partner’s criminal involvement
# marital happiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144*
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 170
F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.74*** 12.11***
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .417 .432
 P ! .10.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
partner may have motivational significance, but underscores the need to
consider this in conjunction with the partner’s own behavioral repertoire.
These results provide evidence that attachment processes are more use-
fully conceptualized as part of a larger set of coalescing mechanisms rather
than as stand-alone influences on the desistance process.45
The findings described above should be viewed as tentative, given the
small sample size and cross-sectional nature of the analysis. Indeed, when
we examined the effect of these variables relying on the two waves of
interviews (recall that the sample size is even smaller in these analyses),
45 These results contrast with Sampson and Laub’s finding that the “effect of a deviant
spouse is insignificant and close to zero” (1993, p. 191), whereas marital attachment
has a “large negative effect on crime.” We do not believe that this difference is due to
inclusion of women in the sample. Analysis of separate models indicates strong effects
for men and women. Indeed, a gender by partner crime interaction is significant,
indicating a stronger effect for men (see Giordano, Cernkovich, and Holland [2003]
for a more complete analysis of gender and partner influence processes).
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we found a long-term effect of partner crime, but marital happiness and
the interaction term (partner’s crime by happiness) were not significant
(results not shown). This result is not altogether surprising, since the
longitudinal framework links information about partners from 1995 with
a longer term pattern of behavior that includes self-reports of crime at
the time of the more recent follow-up (when many respondents were no
longer with the 1995 partner).46
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF DERAILMENTS
Desistance is generally understood as reflecting a consistent pattern of
crime cessation; yet reoffending, parole violations, relapse, and what Laub
and Sampson (2003) refer to as a “zigzag pattern” are also extremely
common occurrences observed in long-term follow-up studies of delin-
quent youths (see e.g., Bushway et al. 2001). These more episodic de-
railments present a problem for extant theories of desistance, particularly
when we focus on actors who have developed strong bonds to conven-
tional others and/or who have clearly expressed a strong commitment to
turning their lives around (a cognitive transformation).47 A focus on emo-
tional processes and the emotional self, however, provides one conceptual
bridge between broader life course trends and situated actions that come
to be associated with specific derailment experiences.48 First, we noted
above that the emotional self is constantly evolving, but continually in-
corporates past selves into the current view (see also Mattley 2002). Sec-
ond, we pointed out that one’s self-feelings and stance toward the outer
46 The significance of partner crime could reflect a long-term influence process; it is
also possible that this variable may index level of involvement in a deviant subculture
that could have a lingering influence, even if specific partners have changed over time.
47 Laub and Sampson (2003) found that alcohol was often implicated in the life histories
of those men in the Glueck sample who had evidenced a more episodic “zigzag” pattern.
These authors also noted that some of these derailments (e.g., getting into a fight) were
not considered by the men as “real crime.” The latter observation is in line with a
symbolic interactionist approach in highlighting some of the consequences of different
systems of meaning, in addition to the impact of variations in informal social control.
Laub and Sampson’s finding of an association with alcohol abuse is also a useful clue
about derailments. However, given the closely aligned nature of drugs and crime,
particularly in the contemporary context, a return to substance abuse can more properly
be classified as a particular type of failure to desist, rather than an explanation for
the episodic derailment pattern.
48 The affect control theory version of symbolic interactionism (see e.g., MacKinnon
1994) may be especially useful in developing a sociology of derailments, since this
perspective highlights that emotions signal the relation between experiences and def-
initions of the situation, i.e., the theory has been useful when applied to an under-
standing of cognitive and emotional processes as they unfold and are modified in
response to the contingencies of specific interactive situations.
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world have a certain integrity or independence from the actions that flow
directly from major role performances. Finally, emotions provide a needed
link to corporeal processes (Shilling 1999). These considerations are es-
pecially useful as we seek to understand the behavior of individuals who
have made some beneficial life changes, only to become embroiled in a
violent altercation or experience a particular drug relapse. Consider, for
example, Tisha’s description of events that led up to an act of violence,
one that occurred after a rather lengthy period of carving out a more
conforming lifestyle:
Tisha: I was always with somebody, always, school, something, neighbors
. . . I just liked to fight . . . but now I’ve found I got a lot more self-
control than what I used to though.
Q: But you think you have . . . if somebody provoked you, you could
unload on them?
Tisha: Oh yeah. I did right here. It was last year. . . . My ex-sister-in-law
come down here. Me and my husband has took her two kids three dif-
ferent occasions, and took care of them. She come down in here doing
that shit [drugs] again, so I took them again. And then she come in here,
telling me what to do . . . cause I cashed her welfare check, just to get
these boys some clothes for school. I was clothing them, I was sending
them to school, that check in my opinion belonged to them. . . . I cashed
her damn check . . . she tried to have me throwed in jail. I told her no,
it ain’t happening. I done told welfare all about it. You’re screwed, man,
you’re out of it. You ain’t getting no drug money. . . . Your young’uns
. . . go look at them. . . . Don’t they look good? Too bad, you can’t
have them, and then one day she was out here and commenced slapping
the hell out of her boy . . . the oldest one. . . . And I’m watching her
through the kitchen door . . . and Jason my boyfriend, he said, you’re
not getting in it. I said no I’m not, I said it’s none of my business. . . .
So I met them here at the front door. I said what the hell’s going on.
She said it ain’t none of your business. I said bullshit. I said, thanks to
you, HUD and Welfare and everybody else is making me have you stay
here . . . whatever pertains in your life pertains to mine. I am head of
this household, whatever’s going on . . . and this young’un’s getting a
beating for . . . I . . . it is my business, cause he’s in my temporary
custody, not yours. . . . I’ve had a 12-year problem with this woman
. . . for 12 years she has did nothing but intimidate me, and I’ve always
been scared of her. I mean, because she’s a bulldog (laughs) and I’m just
a little thing. I mean, she’s a big old girl . . . she’s mean. . . . I’ve seen
her knock men out bigger than her. You know, she just pushed me one
too many times in my doorway, and I flew into her . . . and by the time
we got in the house in the kitchen I commenced then to beating the hell
out of her on my kitchen floor . . . and she just laid there . . . flopping
. . . just a flopping . . . flopping . . . and I wasn’t going to quit. I mean,
I’m not the kind of person to hit somebody that ain’t going to hit me
back, you know . . . when they’re just laying there I’ll walk away. . . .
I’m not that mean, you know, but on that woman . . . yeah, I was going
nuts. I was just ready to lose it. I backhanded my boyfriend . . . knocked
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him down clean over here into the other side of the wall onto the couch
from my kitchen . . . told him you get the fuck away from me I’m killing
this bitch. . . . I’ve had it with her . . . she’ll not intimidate these children
no more or me. . . . I’ve had it.
Given Tisha’s early delinquent background and current example of a
violent altercation, we might conclude that this respondent is simply im-
pulsive and lacks self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). But this
line of reasoning is ultimately somewhat tautological and does little to
illuminate specific patterns of crime as they unfold within a given of-
fender’s lifetime. Self-control theory, for example, neither explains Tisha’s
rather long period of adult desistance, nor does it shed light on the specific
individual or social processes that precipitated the current incident.
Tisha’s longer (188 page) narrative and self-report/arrest histories suggest
that Sampson and Laub’s age-graded theory is more adequate as an
explanation of the long period of desistance, as we observe that Tisha has
a partner who provides a level of stability and support. Tisha also de-
scribes a change in perspective and identity (a cognitive transformation)
that may have enhanced her desistance potential (I’ve found I got a lot
more self-control). However, emotional processes and Tisha’s emotional
self seem central to an understanding of how and why the violent “de-
railment” incident unfolds.
Yet even as Tisha describes her emotional display as a case of going
nuts, our theoretical perspective requires that we reject the notion that
in this instance, emotions have “taken over,” rendering useless rational
faculties or relational considerations (Katz 1999). Instead, we wish to
emphasize that rational and relational considerations are still very much
involved, and are in good alignment with Tisha’s emotional feelings.
However, features of the role-taking experience itself appear to have
brought to the fore a different set of cognitions and emotions than those
which in the recent past have served well the desistance process
(MacKinnon 1994). In this regard, we note that Tisha does not narrate
this episode as a complete failure experience. On the contrary, her de-
scription of this social interaction includes several positive self-descrip-
tions. But other aspects of the social situation threaten her still evolving
“worthy” self, and newly earned sense of respectability (as the drug-in-
volved relative undermines her parenting efforts, implies that she stole a
welfare check, and the like) (see generally, Stryker and Burke 2000, p.
288). Thus, Tisha also brings to the current interactive situation prior
aversive (role-taking) experiences with this relative that in the past have
evoked anger, fear, and other negative emotions. Part of the past-present-
future mix is her own knowledge that she has, in spite of her small size,
shown herself to be quite capable of taking care of herself. All of these
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elements combine as Tisha resorts to her old ways of resolving conflicts
(Davies 1991). From the vantage point of our theoretical perspective, then,
when her ex-sister-in-law pushes her one too many times in the doorway,
Trisha does not just “lose it,” for by her own account, she was ready to
lose it. This provides a further illustration of the idea of coalescing pro-
cesses, but in this instance the confluence of social, cognitive, and emo-
tional mechanisms is detrimental to her long-term goal of sustained be-
havior change. In our view, a useful direction for future research on adult
crime patterns would be to forge more systematic theoretical and empirical
links between symbolic interaction’s historical focus on the immediate
situation, and the longer vantage point of the life course perspective (see,
e.g., Joas 1985, pp. 101–3; Tedeschi 1997; Wilkinson and Fagan 2001).
THE CONTINUING (EMOTIONAL) IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL
DISADVANTAGE
Our analysis has suggested specific ways in which the serious offender’s
progress, continued difficulties, or setbacks (derailments) are better un-
derstood when emotional processes and their social origins have been
taken into account. Consistent with our focus on role-taking processes,
we have generally emphasized the actor’s conduct within an immediate
network of affiliations. Yet scholars have stressed that the character of
these networks and the social dynamics within them are shaped by
broader social forces (see Stryker 1980). Interactive situations that give
rise to emotional feelings such as those referenced above are influenced
in myriad ways by the actor’s location in the social structure (Gordon
1990; Lively and Heise 2004). Disadvantage undoubtedly influences both
role-based and less obviously role-based emotional dynamics.
First, poverty is systematically linked to the likelihood that individuals
will be able to put together and maintain the type of respectability package
that all researchers agree can prove a powerful hook for change. Emo-
tional reactions to these ongoing difficulties provide a proximal, mediating
link to continued involvement and/or episodic derailments. As chronic
offenders have matured into adulthood, it becomes much more difficult
to sustain the rather particularistic views of self that may have sufficed
during the adolescent years (e.g., the loyal gang member). Those who are
not doing well financially continually confront, through their day-to-day
role-taking experiences, the reality that such staples of the adult worthy
self as economic viability, a stable family life, and home ownership are
proving elusive or impossible to secure within their own lives.49 For ex-
49 If emotions emerge in “problematic situations,” that is, situations in which actions
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ample, George, in his most recent interview, described his feelings about
a period of time when his children slept on the couch in the living room,
as a contrast with his drug dealing days, when both had their own rooms.
While we do not suggest that the children’s sleeping arrangements literally
caused the behavior of drug dealing, this evocative “scene” reflects and
further engages cognitive, emotional, and linguistic processes that may
serve as “hooks” for continued involvement. Highlighting the emotional
valence attached to this imagery (and the life circumstances associated
with the image) adds to the notion of crime as a rational choice. This also
provides a needed corollary to our prior emphasis on “hooks” for change
that organize the progressive narratives of more successful desisters.
Other significant life problems incorporated into the narratives do not
appear to relate directly to economic issues, but on closer inspection ac-
tually contain many elements that relate to the respondents’ marginal
social and economic circumstances. For example, in the long derailment
scenario involving Tisha, the pivotal reason for the fight was that her ex-
sister-in-law was mistreating her son, Tisha’s foster child. However, an
important source of contention between the two was the sister-in-law’s
welfare check that Tisha had cashed in order to obtain funds for the teen’s
basic expenses. Dana, a respondent who had experienced numerous prob-
lems relating to conflict with her ex-husband, provides another illustration
of emotional difficulties that eventually connect back to poverty and social
disadvantage:
And he threatens me all the time that I’ll have to find another babysitter,
and I threaten him back with child support and he’s like, “Well I’ll take
you to court ‘cause I can’t afford this.” I mean it’s like a struggle every
day. I get frustrated. . . . I get fired up. Especially when I’m alone, ‘cause
it’s like I can’t do it. . . . I can’t do it. There’s just not a goddamn thing
I can do about it.
In this instance, if Dana had sufficient resources to hire a traditional
caregiver, she would not be locked into continued aversive, stressful con-
tacts with her ex-husband. As suggested above, many of these adult re-
spondents’ problems with the law involve rather mundane issues of this
sort, rather than spectacular acquisitive crimes. For example, restraining
orders lead to violations of restraining orders, or drug use as a coping
mechanism brings the individual into contact with an array of other illegal
activities.
Economic and social disadvantages undoubtedly also significantly in-
are blocked, it is intuitive to hypothesize that lower SES individuals are exposed to
many more of such situations. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for developing
this link between SES and Mead’s focus on blocked action.
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fluence the nature of actors’ salience hierarchies (Stryker 1980). These
views on what is more and less central in life influence not only what
has been included, but also what has been left out of the narrative, and
contribute further to the disadvantaged emotional positions of these re-
spondents. For example, work-related discourse frequently dominates
adult life history narratives, particularly during the stages of young adult-
hood and middle age (Clausen 1993). And a variety of studies have focused
on women’s preoccupations with juggling work and home/family issues
(Carr 2002). In contrast, the world of relationships and the strong feelings
they engender looms large for individuals who do not have a fully di-
versified portfolio of interests and concerns. And certainly money does
not ensure happiness, but a lack of resources, adequate living space, and
dignified work frequently erode relationship building and sustaining pro-
cesses.50 Some problems and altercations described within the narratives,
then, appear to relate to this lack of balance. In this climate, seemingly
trivial problems sometimes elicit strong emotional reactions and eventuate
in larger problems, as occurs in this escalating sequence that began with
a criticism of the focal respondent’s cooking:
I’m cooking dinner. He says, “I don’t know why you cooked that shit cause
I ain’t about to eat it. You can just throw that shit in the trash can.” He
just come in the house, drinking that watered down vodka. He just was
sickening and I got so tired of him talking to me any kind of way. . . .
One day I had had it. I hit his ass one day so hard . . . and then he just
took that knife and put it up against my skin and just came down—my
flesh was wide open, blood running all over the place.—Kristen
CONCLUSION
This analysis explored immediate and long-term connections between
emotional processes and patterns of criminal behavior. Focusing on the
later adult lives of a contemporary sample of delinquent youth, we have
argued that (a) there is more to “life” than transition events, and (b) there
is more to transition events than is reflected in their social control poten-
tial. We developed a neo-Meadian perspective that contrasts with stable
trait views of emotion-crime linkages (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) as
well as emphases of Laub and Sampson’s (2003) social control perspective
on the desistance process. The theoretical discussion and findings also
50 Liebow (1967), e.g., argued that a dearth of economic resources at once heightens
the significance of personal relationships while simultaneously fostering greater vul-
nerabilities within the interpersonal realm.
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serve as a rejoinder to our own overly aseptic theory of cognitive trans-
formation (Giordano et al. 2002).
We highlighted three developmental changes not fundamentally tied to
transition events that may be associated with aggregate declines in crim-
inal behavior: the diminution of negative emotions originally connected
to crime, the diminution of positive emotions, and increased skill in emo-
tion regulation or management. The revised symbolic interactionist per-
spective we outlined also highlights that emotional identity is an important
dimension of the self’s content. This idea is supported by cross-sectional
and longitudinal data documenting that anger identity is associated with
variations in adult crime, net of the actor’s current level of social bonding
or early delinquency. Depression also distinguishes stable desisters from
persisters and those who evidenced an unstable pattern. Significant as-
sociations between these aspects of emotional identity (particularly anger
identity) and violence as well as drug/alcohol problems are also potentially
important, as these adult problem areas often figure directly or indirectly
into further adult legal difficulties.
The notion of an emotional self that flourishes somewhat independent
of adult transitions such as marriage thus has implications for under-
standing aggregate crime trends, individual variations, as well as episodic
derailments. The argument also provides a modest critique of the “events”
orientation of the life course paradigm more generally.51 Our emphasis
here accords with recent research documenting increases in age at mar-
riage, declines in marital stability, and a more highly varied order of all
of the major adult transition events. And as many scholars have pointed
out, these societal level transformations have influenced the life course
experiences of marginal populations more than advantaged groups (Booth,
Crouter, and Shanahan 1999). The processes we emphasized also have
implications for prevention and intervention efforts: it is difficult to pro-
vide job opportunities for offenders, and often impossible to influence the
likelihood, character, or stability of marriages. Our findings suggest that
anger identity and depression are two potentially malleable areas where
early intervention could make a difference, whether or not individuals
have secured all elements of the “respectability package (marriage and a
stable job).” In addition, targeting these areas may increase the likelihood
that individuals will be able to benefit from these and other positive hooks
for change that do become available within the environment.
51 Life course research that focuses on subjective processes often explores how indi-
viduals feel about various transition events, in effect continuing the event-based em-
phasis (i.e., the idea of normative timing; see e.g., Marini 1984). Settersten and Mayer
(1997), e.g., acknowledge a need to move beyond primary events and role transitions.
Nevertheless, their examples of secondary processes also relate back to these events/
roles (e.g., second jobs, periods of unemployment).
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A second objective of the analysis has been to show that even when
we focus specifically on transition events (notably marriage), attention to
emotional processes adds to our understanding of mechanisms that influ-
ence desistance from crime. The specific form of role taking involved in
a loving relationship with a more prosocial romantic partner engenders
positive emotions that contribute to the actor’s motivation to embark on
a significant self-improvement project. Once involved in the relationship,
the spouse acts as an emotional role model and source of social support.
This type of relationship fosters feelings about the self and others that
help to sustain initial moves toward the prosocial. The positive emotions
associated with such a relationship are self-satisfying and serve as re-
placements for the original (negative and positive) emotional connections
to crime, drugs, or violence. These relationships are thus usefully theorized
as an important basis of life’s meaning, as well as a source of informal
social control. This is more than a theoretical fine point. While the added
structure and new routines Sampson and Laub emphasized are important
concomitants of marriage and in turn desistance, in our view these are
not the central mechanisms underlying the marriage benefit. Further un-
packing of the good marriage effect is warranted, particularly if we are
to generalize beyond partner influences to consider ways in which other
hooks for change do or do not serve well as effective catalysts. We note,
for example, that treatment strategies such as boot camps designed to
provide added structure and routine have been shown to be rather limited
in their ability to reduce recidivism (Mackenzie, Wilson, and Kidder 2001).
Self-processes that derive from a process of role taking (including emo-
tional transformations that increase a sense of worth or purpose) may
prove more central to an understanding of successful, sustained behavior
change.52
Future research could usefully explore the role of emotional processes
in relation to other specific catalysts for change. For example, Rambo
(1993) and other scholars who have studied religious conversions note
that emotions are central to the conversion process (see also Pargament
1997). According to the logic of our theorizing, the emotional component
may be heavily implicated in the initial conversion experience (the
crossing-over phase), and spirituality for some offenders and addicts has
proven an effective vehicle for emotion coping (see Terry 2003). Further,
like-minded social network members may serve as emotional role models
and provide active social support (more emotion-coping assistance). Fi-
nally, through a continuous process of role taking, these affiliations with
52 It is important to highlight that fulfilling activities and social relationships will
generally be required to influence such identity changes (i.e., we are not referring here
to vacuous self-esteem boosting efforts).
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others may encourage self-feelings that support the actor’s increasingly
other-directed actions and associated more worthy view of self. Thus the
“redemption” process (Maruna 2001) likely involves socially supported
emotional changes as well as cognitive and identity transformations. In
turn, a focus on all of these mechanisms adds to the idea that religion
serves as an effective form of informal social control (Durkheim 1965).
This study also provides a concrete application of recent trends in
theorizing that have underscored the links between cognitive and emo-
tional processes. Thus, we have not abandoned our prior emphasis on
the cognitive, but here have endeavored to show the closely aligned nature
of these subjective phenomena—whether the referent is behavioral con-
tinuity, change, or a specific derailment experience. Many discussions of
the interconnected nature of cognitions and emotions are philosophical
(Pacherie 2002) or consist of experimental manipulations that examine
the influence of one or more emotions on cognitive tasks, or demonstrate
the cognitive underpinnings of various emotional reactions (see e.g., Laz-
arus 1999). We have shown that materials such as life history narratives
also provide support for this more contemporary view of compatibility
rather than an opposition between cognitive and emotional processes. This
emphasis also has implications for current approaches to interventions
with offender populations. Although a number of treatment strategies
now explicitly target cognitive processes (e.g., the notion of cognitive re-
structuring; see e.g., Wilson, Bouffard, and Mackenzie 2005), these pro-
grams often do not foreground the emotions, or continue to place the two
facets of human experience in opposition (i.e., where emotion p crime,
and desistancep cognition). A neo-Meadian perspective suggests the need
to highlight not only ways in which cognitions and emotions are mutually
supportive, but in turn how these are shaped by social processes. This
requires moving beyond the relatively individualistic, “deficit” emphasis
of many intervention strategies (e.g., the idea of “thinking errors”), and
explicitly recognizing that many offenders’ negative attitudes and feelings
do have social and indeed rational underpinnings (e.g., as these are ac-
tively shaped by victimization experiences, limited housing options, loss
of custody of children, inability to drive to work site due to prior DUI
convictions, marital discord, and the like).
We also used poverty/economic disadvantage as an example to further
anchor this discussion of the social nature of emotions to broader struc-
tural considerations. Poverty influences many of the processes highlighted
in this analysis. Thus, forging additional connections to structurally based
sources of disadvantage (the idea of “emotional capital”) deepens the con-
trast to a view of emotional vulnerabilities as a mere reflection of an
enduring individual propensity. Obviously, such key structuring variables
as race/ethnicity and gender also influence emotional processes as well as
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crime trajectories, and these deserve more systematic treatment than we
have given them in this analysis. However, our general approach and
findings suggest specific areas that warrant additional research attention.
For example, the quantitative analyses indicate that African-American
respondents in the study are more likely to have persisted in crime, relative
to their white counterparts. Our neo-Meadian perspective suggests the
utility of exploring emotional dynamics as well as objective areas of dis-
advantage that may serve to sustain this differential life course pattern
(see also Heimer and Matsueda 1997, pp. 248–49).
Future research could also usefully explore additional links between
gender, emotion, and crime (see Broidy et al. 2003). The gender interaction
results described above documented many areas of similarity as well as
some differences (e.g., anger identity was similarly related to violence
perpetration, crime, and drug/alcohol abuse, but depression was more
strongly linked to crime among men in the sample). These interaction
results should be considered tentative due to the small size of this sample
group and the gender subsamples in particular. Consistent with the neo-
Meadian perspective we developed, however, we see utility in exploring
gendered variations in emotional experience and in the social and cog-
nitive underpinnings of emotional processes, while avoiding stereotypical
bifurcations (e.g., the notion that women are more heavily influenced by
emotions, while men act upon the basis of rational processes; see e.g.,
Fischer 2000; Shields 2002).
APPENDIX A
Scales Used in the Quantitative Analyses
Problem Behavior Indices
Criminal ivolvement.—What about the last 12 months? How often did
you . . . Damage or destroy property? Steal (or try to steal) a motor
vehicle, such as a car or motorcycle? Steal (or try to steal) something
worth more than $50? Carry a hidden weapon other than a plain pocket
knife? Steal (or try to steal) things worth $5 or less? Attack someone with
the idea of seriously hurting him/her? Get involved in a gang fight? Sell
marijuana or hashish (“pot,” “grass,” or “hash”)? Hit (or threaten to hit)
somebody? Sell hard drugs such as heroin, cocaine, or LSD? Have (or try
to have) sexual relations with someone against their will? Get drunk in
a public place? Break into a building or vehicle (or try to break into) to
steal something or just to look around? Use drugs to get high (not because
you were sick)? Use force or threat of force to get money or other things?
Been paid for having sex with someone? Take things from work worth
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more than $50?—Responses range from 1 (never) to 9 (more than once a
day).
Intimate partner violence perpetration.—During the past year, how
many times have you . . . Threatened to hit or throw something at your
spouse/partner? Hit or thrown something at your spouse/partner? Pushed,
grabbed or shoved your spouse/partner? Slapped your spouse/partner?
Kicked, bit or hit your spouse/partner with your fist? Hit or tried to hit
your spouse/partner with something? Beaten up your spouse/partner?
Threatened your spouse/partner with a knife? Used a knife on or fired a
gun at your spouse/partner?—Responses range from 1 (never) to 8 (almost
daily).
General violence subscale.—What about the last 12 months? How often
did you . . . Attack someone with the idea of seriously hurting him/her?
Used force or threat of force to get money or other things? Have (or try
to have) sexual relations with someone against their will? Get involved
in a gang fight?—Responses range from 1 (never) to 9 (more than once
a day).
Problem use of alcohol and drugs.—These refer to “how often in the
past 12 months you have experienced these things?” Not felt so good the
next day because of drinking? Not felt so good the next day because of
using drugs? Felt unable to do my best job at work or school because of
drinking? Felt unable to do my best job at work or school because of
using drugs? Gotten into trouble with my relatives or friends while drink-
ing? Gotten into trouble with my relatives or friends while using drugs?
Hit one of my family members because of my drinking? Hit one of my
family members because of my using drugs? Gotten into fights with others
because of my drinking? Gotten into fights with others because of my
using drugs? Stolen money or other things in order to get cash to buy
alcohol? Stolen money or other things in order to get cash to buy drugs?—
Responses range from 1 (never) to 9 (more than once a day).
Emotional Constructs
Anger identity.—How much [you] agree or disagree with these statements
from a larger section about “how you feel about the world today, about
yourself, and your life in general.” When people say or do something that
hurts me, I usually try to hurt them back. I can be a pretty mean person.
I have a lot of trouble controlling my temper. When I drink I sometimes
become pretty mean. When I’m really angry, other people better stay
away from me.—Responses range from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly
disagree).
Depression.—In the past 12 months, how often have you . . . Wondered
if anything is worthwhile? Been in low spirits? Had trouble sleeping? Had
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periods of time when you could not get going? Felt that things never turn
out right? Had trouble remembering things? Felt irritable, fidgety or
tense? Felt restless?—Responses range from 1 (never or almost never) to
6 (almost every day).
APPENDIX B
Methodological Approach to the Qualitative Data
Life history narratives do not provide direct access to the causes of crime
or desistance processes, and necessarily involve a reconstruction of past
and current circumstances from the point of view of the actor telling the
life story (Neisser 1994). Nevertheless, such materials are useful as they
point to conceptual areas, including subjective processes, that may be
overlooked when relying on traditional quantitative methods. We began
the analysis by flagging emotion-related sections of the narratives for
further study. The first stage involved a long period of open coding, memo
writing, and discussion of these segments and a general assessment of the
place of emotions in the total life history. As the analysis progressed, we
developed more specific codes linked to particular emotions, either as
described by the respondent (pissed me off), or as reflected in emotions
actually elicited during the interview (respondent is crying). Several stages
of the analysis are not immediately obvious within the discussion that
follows, but were a necessary step in the process of developing the points
we have chosen to highlight. For example, gender issues are of interest,
but are not the central focus of the current analysis. Nevertheless, com-
paring men and women’s narratives was an important step in the analysis.
Based on these analyses, we concluded that while many aspects of adult
development are gendered, the very basic emotional and cognitive pro-
cesses described in this study are useful in understanding life course pat-
terns evidenced by woman as well as men. Later stages of the analysis
involved the development of second order constructs (e.g., the concept of
derailments), and a closer examination of links between cognitive and
emotional processes. We initially began to study these connections because
of difficulties in coding certain examples. That is, it was often difficult to
consider a given section or story predominantly emotional because it also
contained references to the cognitive domain. Further study of such stories
thus led to our emphasis on alignments or connections between cognitive,
emotional, and control-related processes. Similarly, while it was useful in
certain ways to develop files that contained shorter segments of emotion
talk, we also regretted the lost connection to the broader set of life cir-
cumstances reflected in the complete narratives. This eventually led to
our focus in the final section on structural influences, emotional vulner-
abilities, and criminal involvement.
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